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ABSTRACT 
 
Too Few Voices; Too Many Distractions; Too Little 
Understanding: the American Media  
During the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 
 
 Upwards of one million people died during the Genocide, Civil War, and Refugee Crisis 
in Rwanda and surrounding nations, during one of the fastest Genocides to occur in modern 
history.  Even though the United Nations and its member states had a legal mandate to intervene 
in cases of Genocide due to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide, the world chose not to.  While there were a myriad of reasons for this the media 
played a part in this situation. 
 Using the coverage of US print magazine articles, this thesis argues that the media missed 
the point and the signs of what was happening on the ground due to a fundamental lack of 
understanding of Rwanda, the African Great Lakes region, and Africa itself.  Borrowing 
concepts of the creation of the “other,” lack of understanding of Africa, imperial language, and 
first world views of the third world from Edward Said and Curtis A. Keim this master’s thesis 
shows that there were intellectual disconnects happening within the American press that made 
intervention nearly impossible.  Once the Genocide was nearly complete and a more prosaic 
refugee crisis started America jumped at the chance to aid the refugees, a large number of them 
perpetrators of the Genocide, and the media showed reinvigorated interest in Rwanda.   
 What misconceptions about Rwanda caused the media to miss the point?  Did the print 
media help perpetuate those misconceptions, knowingly or unknowingly?  With a death toll from 
the Genocide alone of roughly 8,000 people per day and the vast majority of them dying within 
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the first several weeks of the Genocide, many lives may have been saved if Rwanda was made a 
priority by the media.  Instead, while the media reported stories about chthonic hatred, the world 
was more concerned about a much slower Genocide in Eastern Europe.  While attention was 
focused on other global and national stories, a racist regime intent on exterminating the Tutsi was 
allowed to stay in power in Rwanda.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The Rwandan Genocide has been the subject of considerable scholarly and popular 
attention.  International relations and United Nations involvement have been addressed.  Studies 
on the role of nongovernmental organizations and churches have also been released.  Firsthand 
accounts from military personnel, survivors, NGO workers, and journalists have been published.  
Works on international and internal court systems, the role of Rwanda in the region, and the 
repercussions of the Genocide have also been written.    Attention has been paid to media in all 
forms, be it newspapers, magazines, radio, and broadcast and cable television; Rwandan, 
American, French, or otherwise.  This thesis fills a gap in the literature by focusing on American 
written media coverage of and the interplay between language and the “othering” of Rwandans.   
 It should be noted that one of the main thrusts of this work is to show how the language 
used within the US print media served to lessen, exoticize, and limit understanding of the 
Genocide.  Whether this was intentional or not, the power of language can be seen in the general 
inaction and hand wringing of Western governments and international organizations.  As 
language is, in its own way, power, language can be used for many purposes.  One of the uses of 
language in this work is to always capitalize Genocide whether the topic is the Rwandan 
Genocide, any other historical Genocides, or even Genocide as a concept.  Something as horrific 
as the purposeful attempted slaughter of an entire population group for political, military, or 
cultural reasons should have a name; which it already does.  It should have laws banning it.  It 
has that as well, however infrequently those laws are invoked.  It should also be a proper noun.  
All acts of Genocide are by their very nature abominable.  Genocide in World War I Turkey is as 
odious as Genocide in World War II Germany, Stalin’s Soviet Union, the Khmer Rouge’s 
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Cambodia, World War II Nanking, 1994 Rwanda, or Darfur and Congo in recent years.  All of 
these tragedies should have proper names and this work acts as if they already do.   
 This thesis will show that the Rwandan Genocide was, while it was occurring, never fully 
understood by the American media.  Rwanda was almost entirely unknown to Americans at the 
time and even years after the highly successful and critically acclaimed Hollywood blockbuster 
Hotel Rwanda was released it is safe to assume most Americans could not find it on a map.  It is 
a small nation, a poor nation, and a nation that is known for little save the Genocide that thrust in 
onto the international stage, or perhaps as a nation famous as a habitat of gorillas.1  America, and 
Western culture in general, has long envisioned less known parts of the world as exotic, 
different, unknowable, and less civilized.  This coupled with Rwanda’s distance geographically, 
culturally, and historically vis-a-vis America made Rwanda a virtual unknown to most 
Americans.  It did not even have the tenuous cultural connections that Western African nations 
have with the United States through the slave trade, as Rwanda has always been more tied to 
East Africa as opposed to West Africa.   
 Despite international laws banning Genocide, America, along with most of the rest of the 
world, did nothing to stop the slaughter.  With a media that was not knowledgeable about 
Rwanda it fell back on clichés, poor understanding, and whatever information they could cobble 
together in a short period of time.  Even when the media tried to consult experts that were 
knowledgeable about Rwanda and the African Great Lakes region they could, and still did, fall 
back on hackneyed clichés of an exotic and unknowable Africa.  Rwanda, the Genocide, the 
Rwandan Civil War, and the refugee crisis were all covered by the media, but there was a sense 
of fatalism instead of one of urgency. 
                                                 
1 Dian Fossey, Gorillas in the Mist, (New York: Mariner Books, 2000) and the Hollywood film of the same name.   
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 The main thrust of this work is that in an era of distractions, globally and nationally, the 
American media, in this case the magazine industry, showed lack of understanding of Rwanda on 
a fundamental level.  This created false impressions that may have affected policy choices during 
that time about Rwanda, and in a more general sense helped to reinforce issues of the lack of 
importance of Africa geo-politically.  Rwanda was seen as just another sub-Saharan African 
problem nation where the “natives” could not control themselves.  The issues in Rwanda went 
far beyond ethnicity; they went far beyond political power.  They were imported problems from 
the age of the Scramble for Africa, scientific racism, and the need to set up socio-ethnic 
divisions.2  While these issues were addressed in some of the articles those doing the reporting 
are still coming from a world in which these outdated ideas have some kind of validity.  People 
in Africa fight because they are less civilized than Westerners.  Rwandans fight due to ancient 
rivalries.  Genocide is a natural occurrence in an uncivilized and ultimately backwards nation.   
 In many ways this was a case of ignorance, willful or otherwise, by most of the players 
involved in this process.  Those that should have been in the know, such as reporters, editors, and 
government officials (elected or appointed), did not properly appreciate the situation on the 
ground.  The evolving situation was covered in such a way by the American magazine industry 
as a vicious conflict between warring tribes that have hated each other since before the coming of 
Europeans.  This situation would seem familiar to anyone with even cursory knowledge of 
Africa due to the way European colonial masters put together the current borders of African 
countries, often placing multiple ethno-linguistic groups into the same country to be able to play 
the various groups off of each other.  In this aspect, Rwanda followed a different narrative than is 
                                                 
2 Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The International Dimensions of Genocide in Rwanda, (New York: New York University 
Press: 1998), 6-7.   
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“traditionally” seen in Africa.  This narrative of dual slaughter, equating Genocide with less 
frequent and less deadly atrocities committed by the rebel force opposing the genocidal regime, 
provided a level of moral relativism.   
 As these two streams of thought and action dovetailed together a Refugee Crisis emerged.  
This situation commanded more and more media attention, pulling attention away from the 
Genocide and perhaps pushing the West towards action regarding the Refugee Crisis where 
almost no action was taken to stop the Genocide.  By the time the gravity of the situation was 
understood the Genocide was ended, not by the international community but instead by the rebel 
RPF.  The United Nations and its constituent members were able to avoid their legal 
responsibility to stop Genocide and became more concerned with feeding and clothing a refugee 
population that had many perpetrators of Genocide within it than it was with stopping their 
crimes or seeking to punish those perpetrators.   
While neither the notion of a dual Genocide or of separate tribes with completely 
disparate identities were true, these ideas influenced the reporting, and that reporting helped 
rationalize the foreign policy choices.  Rwanda was has not been at any point since before 
European contact a nation of divided tribes.  There were ethnic differences, but those differences 
were not ones of language or even culture.  Different ethnic groups had long filled different roles 
within the society.  Combine that with a racially, or ethnically, charged governmental agenda and 
the difficulties of coming to terms with modernity and there was a powder keg but it was one of 
ethnic strife, not one of primordial hatred.3  In a situation where chthonic hatreds were at their 
core Genocide could not be stopped, but the later refugee crisis was something that Western guilt 
                                                 
3 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 5-23.   
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could sink its teeth into by reviving the oft referenced, hackneyed, and ultimately false “white 
man’s burden.”4   
 Reporters did not understand the situation when the Rwandan Civil War restarted after a 
lengthy lull and the Genocide started in earnest at the same time.  This lack of understanding is 
rooted in the same timeframe as the issues that divided the Rwandan population.  Scientific 
racism not only had to make the Tutsi superior because Europeans found a quasi-feudal 
civilization upon their arrival in Rwanda, but Europeans also had to justify their placing 
themselves above all Rwandans.5  This colonial legacy shows through in the reporting.  As 
Rwanda was a colony somehow Rwandans were inferior and, thus, “othered.”  Going as far back 
as the early years of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, Europeans started making intimations about 
racial superiority as they could not do otherwise.  They had to justify their stranglehold on the 
power within the European African relationship.6  While there were certainly Africans that were 
more powerful than those that became slaves, they were eventually subjugated as well.     
 This context becomes even more convoluted, when after centuries of redirecting other 
African slave trading routes towards Europe and her colonies, Europeans suddenly decided that 
the evil that was the slave trade had to stop.  By going from the African as slave motif fully into 
the African as savage that must be Christianized, saved from himself, and hopefully 
Westernized, modernized, and remade into the only image that matters, an European one, the 
image of Africans in the Western mind goes from that of someone that is a child that deserves to 
                                                 
4  J.D. Fage, A History of Africa, Fourth Edition, (New York: Routledge 2001).   
5 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 5-23.   
6 Curtis Keim, Mistaking Africa: Curiosities and Inventions of the American Mind, (Boulder, CO and Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1999), 30-1.   
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be a slave to that of a child that must become more European for the good of himself and the 
world.  And, of course, this task fell to the European himself.7   
 This, combined with a nation whose main importance before the Genocide was that of a 
unique case study of how some foreign group obviously brought advanced ideas into Rwanda, 
and there are many important links in the chain of removing agency and humanity from 
Rwandans.  First they are Africans, already savages and inferior to Western minds.  Then add 
that even among African nations Rwanda was low on the power, economic, and social 
importance scales.8  Then you add in the notion that the Tutsi, who were once perceived as 
obviously superior are now not only not in power but many of them are exiled and suddenly 
there is the perfect storm of “othering,” paternalism, and reasons to ignore a political and 
economic backwater.     
 From this setting emerged a media that seemed barely concerned with Rwanda, let alone 
with getting the story right, an international community with “more pressing issues,” and a 
situation that could easily be ignored as the whole situation could be portrayed as savage things 
that happen in savage lands that are inhabited by savages.  Once the media started going in this 
direction it was easy for the American people to ignore Rwanda until they were forced to look 
again once the bodies of those executed in the Genocide were not the only bodies lying on 
ground in the Great Lakes region of Africa.   
Why the Genocide Occurred 
The reasons for the Rwandan Genocide are many.  They were ingrained in history, as 
many in the West would argue, but much of that “history” was a lie imposed on a nation that was 
                                                 
7 Ibid, 31-8. 
8 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 25.   
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already racially, socially, and linguistically integrated well before the coming of Europeans.  
Rwanda did not need a lingua franca, it already had Kinyarwanda.9  It did not need a common 
culture, as it already had one.  While there were divisions of class, or perhaps caste, these 
distinctions meant little.  Europeans had to divide them to use the divide and conquer method 
that worked so well in other colonial areas.10  With the international community forcing the 
Arusha Accords on a largely xenophobic Hutu government President Habyarimana was in many 
ways backed into a corner.  If one believes the theory that his supporters were the ones that 
assassinated him, or arranged it, then they likely did so to stop Arusha from being 
implemented.11   
The economic component to the Genocide is one of falling global coffee prices and a 
regime that relied on international support just to keep Rwanda going.  Without international aid, 
regime collapse was imminent but the aid being tied to a change in government was tantamount 
to the same thing.  Habyarimana and his backers had already done too much to able to expect 
massive popular support in free elections.12   
These issues, when combined with the threat of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and 
the many years of cultural conditioning accomplished by the colonial masters set up a divide 
between ethnic groups that essentially allowed for, if not encouraged, virulent racism.  This 
racism was able to be turned by popular culture outlets such as Radio et Television Libre des 
Milles Colline (RTLM) and local leaders into a fever pitch.  Illegally obtained weapons and the 
                                                 
9 Odette Nyiramongi, Ikinyarwanda - The Language of Rwanda: Language Guide for Travelers, (Charleston, SC: 
BookSurge Publishing, 2009).   
10 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 5-23.   
11 Klinghoffer, The International Dimensions of the Rwandan Genocide, 42.  
12 Ibid, 24, 29.   
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training of militias finished the readying of the masses.  All that was left was giving the go 
order.13 
Theoretical Background 
Language is important.  It matters.  It controls how we view the world and what is and is 
not possible within it.  Within this framework how we look at others becomes tantamount to how 
we interact with them.  If someone is viewed as less advanced due to their faith, religion, creed, 
ethnicity, gender, or place of origin then on some level they are worth less as a person to the 
person that has a, or many, more advanced traits.   
At its core, Orientalism, by Edward Said, is a tome about Western cultural chauvinism 
and condescension.  This work, often cited for various reasons about Western imperialism and 
the cultural, academic, and governmental/bureaucratic mindsets that allowed it to work, and 
allows it to continue to work, within to dominate other cultures.  Said is most specifically dealing 
with the Middle East from the western reaches of North Africa to the border of India.  He also 
deals with India and China as well as other parts of the Far East.  Said discusses methods with 
which the Oriental world was and is described as exotic, backwards, craven, uncivilized in 
comparison to the West, and prone to despotism.  The Orient is also gendered female and is 
described as such, in a very traditional and misogynist sense, as being receptive, weak, and prone 
to emotional outbursts and a lack of control of said emotions.   
All of this fits in the ways in which the West looked and looks at what is euphemistically 
referred to as the “developing world,” those parts of the world that suffered under European 
colonialism and/or hegemony (itself a Western term dating back to the beginnings of Orientalist 
thought at a time when the West had little hope of avoiding dominance by the Orient, the Greek 
                                                 
13 There is a timeline of Rwanda and the Rwandan Genocide in the appendix.    
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City State period of Classical Greek history), and are just now coming out of that period of 
mismanagement of resources and lack of agency, among myriad other problems.  These 
developing nations are now having to contend with the effects of earlier European efforts to draw 
borders that forced consolidation and splitting up of different ethnic, religious, linguistic, and 
cultural groups at the whim of map makers and politicians that often never saw the places or met 
the people they were drawing lines across.   
That these parts of the world have turned from being occupied physically and exploited 
financially while being misunderstood, exoticized, and marginalized to now being left alone 
physically (often to the point of abandonment even when begging for help), while still being 
financially exploited, misunderstood and exocitized is less than surprising.  Colonialism moves 
to post-colonialism moves to neo-colonialism and cultural imperialism.  The strong seek to 
dominate the weak and have little understanding of why the weak are weak and why the strong 
bear some responsibility for that.  Orientalism and its cousins, exoticism and the various forms of 
colonialism, have never gone away.  They have merely shifted their focus and practices over the 
years.14   
Said makes an even stronger point about this in another one of his works, Culture and 
Imperialism.  He discusses a dialectic in which the experiences of someone, say an African, that 
is very different from the viewer, a Westerner, the notion that only another African can 
understand things about those experiences.  While on some level this notion could be understood 
as being “open minded” in the common parlance it also turns the person that can only understand 
being “an Africa,” “a woman,” “a Tutsi,” or “a Christian” into the “other.”  What is often 
forgotten in this type of situation is that a lot of what has divided peoples is imperialism.  As the 
                                                 
14 Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).   
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West rose to power it began to see those of lesser technological and economic status as inferior.  
The very acts of conquest and expansion created a cultural gap, and a certain cultural chauvinism 
that did not go away once colonialism in the traditional sense did.  Europe gained much from the 
Industrial Revolution and the Enlightenment.  These two movements allowed made European 
dominance of the rest of the world easier.   
As Europeans expanded into Africa and Asia they were confronted with people lacking 
their technological advantages, people that in many cases they subjugated.  This started turning 
Africans and others that fell under the yoke of European colonialism into savages in the minds of 
many Europeans.  These new colonial subjects were not only seen as savages but as roadblocks 
to progress.  And, of course, the more that Europe conquered the more this sense of European 
entitlement over others grew.  European disdain for those they conquered also grew.  All of these 
factors reinforced each other to make it so that not only were Europeans “othering” the rest of 
the world, but they were also setting themselves apart and on a higher level culturally and 
intellectually.  Once this happened, European ideas of native backwardness become a part of the 
common discourse and that common discourse did not go away with decolonization.    
Returning to the idea that only people that have experienced something can understand it, 
this is also giving power to notions of culture that are inherently, and to extreme extents, factors 
of history.  By making the experiences of the viewed that is not like the viewer, the traveler, the 
person making a judgment is “othering” the person being viewed.15   
In setting up this dialectic, in which “the African experience” cannot be known, a certain 
amount of mysticism is being added to the equation.  If something is unknowable it is also 
ephemeral, and therefore mystical.  This is akin to kowtowing to the vagaries of history, culture, 
                                                 
15 Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 31-2.   
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development, and other factors far beyond the control of either the Westerner viewing the 
African or the African himself artificial walls are being constructed.16  When this construction is 
one in which Africa was first a source of gold, then slaves, then raw materials to be consumed 
and land and peoples to be conquered and “civilized” this can become much more sinister.  The 
African is not only the other, and not only unknowable, but he is also inferior as the early 
modern, modern, and post modern experiences of the West with Africa involve vastly uneven 
power and development levels.  This strengthens the mysticism of “othering” Africans while also 
allowing, and even encouraging, paternalistic notions.   
Mistaking Africa takes a more direct approach, and unlike Orientalism is a work about 
Africa, particularly below the Sahara.  The main thrust of Curtis Keim’s work is that America 
does not understand Africa and instead of seeking to understand it, it uses imagery of lions and 
other wild beast living next to humans, a continent where everyone is more concerned with their 
tribal allegiances than their country, modernity, politics, and economics.  A land in which 
exoticism and living ancestors of modern man walk, talk, work, play, live, and die in completely 
foreign, wild, and uncivilized ways.17 
Both Said and Keim discuss concepts of covert and overt racism in different ways.  The 
notion that not all racism is intentional is an easy enough idea to understand.  At its root covert, 
unintentional racism is shaped as much by a lack of understanding as it is by hate.  
Misinformation, the lack of information - in whole or in part- and old stereotypes can contribute 
to views on people, places, and situations that are unknown to someone.  If a war is presented as 
in some way part of an ancient hatred that goes back centuries, or even before the written history 
                                                 
16 Ibid.   
17 Keim, Mistaking Africa. 
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of an area it can have a lasting effect.  If people are portrayed as tribal in American culture they 
are being shown to be pre-modern in some way.  Their concerns are not those of normal, modern 
people from the first world.  People from tribal societies are concerned with lineage, blood, 
distant familial relations more than they are concerned with politics, work, or the welfare of their 
nation.   
Cultural chauvinism is a powerful force.  The notion within a society that its customs, 
lifestyle, standard of living, common/shared morality, et al, are superior to another is something 
that happens to a greater or lesser extent within all societies throughout recorded history and 
beyond.  The foreigner, the other, the immigrant, ideas and customs that are different can all be 
frightening on some visceral level.  The way we describe the foreign and the different is through 
language.  Language is, by its very nature, imperfect.  Dictionary definitions of words are not the 
only ones used in the common parlance.  Words are often fraught with meanings beyond those 
static definitions.  Words like tribalism, and phrases like “ancient hatred” convey a feeling of 
inability for the modern world to affect change as these things are chthonic, unknowable, lacking 
in reason, and carrying on almost a life of their own.   
On Civilizing Missions and the Word Tribal 
 The repeated use of the word tribal within Africa is a long established pattern of western 
writing, be it governmental, academic, personal, or otherwise.  There are multiple levels meaning 
involved in the use of this word, both implied and open.  While the use of this word is not always 
as problematic as it will be shown to be in the Rwanda case, and at times it is accurate, but it still 
has powerful undertones that make its use questionable coming from Westerners.  Coming from 
native groups, in this case Africa, it carries its own connotations and biases. The word tribal, 
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coming from a westerner becomes one of power relations.  Europeans are divided into ethnicities 
and nationalities.  In other parts of the world peoples are divided into tribes.  Among those 
groups that are often divided as such in the western mind Africa and the natives of the Americas 
are prominent.  The Cherokee are often referred to as a tribe, as are the Seminole, Navajo, and 
the dozens of other groups.  When someone says they are Native American, or even have some 
Native heritage, they are often asked, “what tribe?”  Groups that had territories, their own 
language, and culture, and dealt with their neighbors as independent groups could be considered 
a nationality.   By labeling them a tribe instead the Western mind seeks a place above them on 
the hierarchy of societies, a hierarchy that is often perceived in a linear fashion.   
 Another facet of the use of the word tribal is that of showing a civilizing mission.  
Whether in Africa, the Americas, or other places around the world the drive to civilize, 
Westernize, Christianize, and in other ways remake the world in the image of Europe and the 
United States have long been a force within the unequal dealings between the West and the 
developing world.  In many ways pointing out the tribal nature of Africans, in particular, was an 
excuse to bring order to chaos.    Due to the artificial creation of African states during the 
scramble for Africa, languages were imposed from above by the colonial masters.  European 
languages became the common language for most African states.  Rwanda and Burundi were 
exceptions to this rule, and while they had to be “civilized,” they already had what amounted to 
national languages.18  It was an excuse for conquest and exploitation of resources and native 
labor.  The cases of Rwanda and Burundi were very dissimilar from the “normal African 
narrative.”19  Both areas had established kingdoms and a common linguistic-cultural 
                                                 
18 J.D. Fage, A History of Africa, Fourth Edition, (London: Routledge, 2002), 413-5 
19 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1, 5-23.   
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organization in place.  While there were outliers within both areas, and beyond the borders that 
were eventually drawn, the vast majority of these territories were ruled by established kingdoms, 
with normalized and functional clientship relations that governed by a complicated but 
understood set of rules and laws.  This is to say that what became the modern states Rwanda and 
Burundi were at worst feudal societies with overarching culture, or, perhaps more realistically, 
nascent nation states before the arrival of Europeans in the area.20   
 Returning to the tribal narrative, not only is using tribe in regards to Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa 
misleading at best, it does not account for the more “normal African narrative.”  Even if one 
concedes the notion that the groups in Nigeria are tribes21 now that they are under a common 
government the more accurate term would be ethnic groups.  Debating that semantic point 
notwithstanding the very tribal, or more accurately diverse, nature of places like Nigeria allowed 
for an excuse for conquest, as well as allowing for a certain ease of conquest and an ease of 
pitting subject groups against each other.  The Nigeria case is informative in that it was a more 
traditional form of European conquest of Africa.  Disparate groups with separate languages, 
cultures, and religious beliefs thrown together by a colonial master that could play them off of 
each other.  A single subject population with long established ties of kinship, language, and 
culture would be much more difficult to rule over.  Divided ethnicities allowed for Europeans to 
use the word tribal in prerogative connotations while turning one native population upon another.  
                                                 
20 Ibid, 5-23.   
21 This study does not seek to make this concession.  Nigeria is not really a nation state in the European sense.  
While there are multiethnic states throughout the history of Europe Nigeria would not easily fit within the model of 
a nation state, which is a state that is controlled by an overarching ethnic-linguistic identity.  The formation of such 
states took centuries and involved no small amount of conflict both internally and externally.  A perfect example is 
France which went from a small portion of land centered around the Paris area to an area that encompassed its 
current borders absorbing along the way Languedoc (which had a related language to the French of the Kingdom of 
France which became modern French), and areas that had historic and cultural ties to both Scandinavia and England 
in the Normandy region, as well as absorbing other areas.  This absorption of territories and peoples and imposition 
of a common language and culture neither happened overnight nor was it without difficulty.   
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When these groups fought against the British colonial masters in Nigeria they were defying 
superior European culture and faith.  When they fought against each other they were savage 
tribes that needed to be civilized.  When those groups that worked for or with the British fought 
against other native groups the narrative of some groups being more civilized than others could, 
and did, emerge.  Tribalism was used as an excuse for all.  The ills of tribalism had to be 
combated at any cost.  Western culture, government, and faith needed to be imposed as much as 
possible to allow Africans a chance to emerge from their chthonic ways.  Atrocities committed 
against Africans by colonial masters were more understandable due to the “illogical” nature of 
tribal societies and the need to civilize and modernize.22   
 The use of this term allows for many things.  From colonization and domination to 
exploitation and ignoring the plight of those that are described as tribal the implication is a less 
advanced society.  Tribalism implies a way of living from before mass literacy, organized states, 
settlements, and society itself.  If one is from a tribe their life can be seen to be worth less than 
the life of someone from the civilized world.  If one is living an archaic way of life they are more 
likely to be at risk of various forms of early demise.  All of these images can be brought forth 
from the word tribal, those and many more.  As such it is not only a term of Western domination 
but it can also be a term of implied racism, cultural chauvinism, and “othering.”  The use by any 
Westerner of the term tribal may not be as obviously vile as overt racist epithets but it has a 
similar implication.  Not only is the modern or post modern world supposed to be beyond such 
concerns but it also shows an amount of backwardness in those termed tribal.     
The amount of media attention garnered by other stories, whether the celebrity driven OJ 
Simpson case and Cobain suicide, the post Cold War fallout in the former Yugoslavia, free 
                                                 
22 J.D. Fage, A History of Africa, 413-5.   
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elections in South Africa, or the disaster in Haiti the media trajectory of the Rwandan Genocide 
follows that of other types of disasters covered by the American press.  Thomas Einsensee and 
David Stromberg’s study of media coverage of natural disasters provides a clear jumping off 
point for looking at how media coverage helps to shape international humanitarian relief.  It also 
shows that “it requires 40 times as many killed in an African disaster to achieve the same 
expected media coverage as for a disaster in Eastern Europe of similar type and magnitude.”23  
This study reflects death tolls involving natural disasters and how location of the natural disasters 
affected coverage.  Considering the lower death toll numbers for Genocide in Bosnia and the 
longer duration, approximately 100,000 dead over a multiyear campaign of extermination in 
Bosnia, between 1992 and 199824, or 150,000 if the 1991-1995 Genocide in Croatia are 
combined with the numbers from Bosnia, versus 800,000 dead in Rwanda in approximately one 
hundred days, these ideas seem to be similar whether looking at natural disasters or Genocide.   
Africa, especially those parts of Africa bereft of noted strategic or economic importance to the 
United States, is simply not as important as Eastern Europe.  Bosnia received a similar amount of 
coverage to Rwanda during the period that this study covers even though the death toll was much 
smaller and the pace of both the Yugoslavian Civil War and the Genocide in Bosnia were glacial 
in comparison.  There were even several similarities in the usage of the word “tribal” between 
media coverage of Rwanda and Bosnia.25   
 Returning to the aforementioned study, it postulates that in the context of disasters in 
diverse geographical areas that even when all the disasters are covered by the media there will be 
                                                 
23 Thomas Einsensee and David Stromberg, “News Floods, News Droughts, American Disaster Relief,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 122, Issue 2 (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2007), 3.  Viewed at 
http://people.su.se/~dstro/wpdisasters.pdf.  Last accessed 8/29/2013   
24 http://genocidewatch.org/genocide/genocidespoliticides.html last accessed on 8/15/2013. 
25 Time, Newsweek, US News and World Report, The New Yorker and various other publications, April through 
August, 1994.  
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a lower level of general concern for the African disaster.  This is equated with a level of “bias” in 
the terms of the authors, or more specifically that the media’s lower level of coverage and 
concern brings on and helps to perpetuate lower level of relief funds for African victims of 
disaster.  This also makes it less likely that policy makers within governmental and private/NGO 
circles would be forced into action or for that matter would be able to achieve something were 
they so inclined.26  Einsensee and Stromburg go on to show that European and Latin American 
disasters are covered three times as often as African and Pacific disasters.  They further state that 
Africa’s type of disasters (droughts, famines, and the like), are less likely to be covered due to 
frequency.27  Taking this idea forward, Africa has been incredibly prone to civil war involving 
ethnic conflict in the later part of the twentieth century.  Conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda, Ethiopia-
Eretria, Nigeria, Liberia, et al, have made it seem, especially to outside observers, as if Africa is 
the flashpoint for the oft discussed “failed state” phenomenon.   
Methods and Scope 
 This study is as much about language, power relations, the media, cultural chauvinism, 
and misunderstanding of the other as it is about the Rwandan Genocide, if not more so.  While 
looking at the number of stories about the Rwandan Genocide, Civil War and the refugee crisis 
in comparison to things like the collapsing former Yugoslavia, the Haiti humanitarian crisis, and 
the O.J. Simpson trial this thesis will also look at and dissect language looking for ways in which 
the media not only misrepresented the case on the ground but did so from a Western point of 
view coming from a sense of superiority, cultural chauvinism, exoticism, and racism.  Any of 
                                                 
26 Einsensee and Stromberg, “News Floods, News Droughts, American Disaster Relief,” 14.   
27 Ibid, 29-30 
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these things can be intentional or not, including racism, and this is not an effort at castigation for 
its own sake but an effort to find reasons for American inertia.   
 The historiographical section of this work seeks to show as many facets of the scholarly 
and non-scholarly debate as possible.  It also pays particular attention to any mentions of the 
American media.  This study strives to show a wide cross current of ideas about what happened 
in 1994 and should succeed in this goal.   
 The magazines covered in this thesis are predominantly mainstream publications like 
Time, Newsweek, and US News and World Report.  While scholars, media critics, and others 
have addressed these types of sources before the systematic method of at least mentioning each 
bit of coverage and meticulously analyzing most of it on paper should provide a new and needed 
perspective on how media involvement, or lack thereof, played a part in US inaction.  Other 
magazines of a more specialized nature are also addressed but this effort cannot be described as 
covering all printed news media from the time, or for that matter all news magazines.   
 Efforts are made to show that the media being off the mark and using “othering” 
language were not only not gaining the proper information but were allowing the international 
community off of the hook for their inaction and providing cover, however unknowingly, for that 
inactivity.   
Placement within the Historiography 
The Rwanda Crisis addresses the topic of the media when dealing with the Genocide as 
an issue largely dealing with an eventual flood of print coverage but not enough television 
coverage to make the events seem real to the outside world.  He argues that without video of the 
killings taking place the Western world could not believe the level of depravity and human 
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suffering that was occurring.28  While his primary concern is not the media Prunier shows that 
media involvement was not sufficient to force major international action during the Genocide.  
That action occurred much later and likely saved more perpetrators of Genocide than anyone is 
comfortable with.   
Prunier also looks at how America handled the situation and discusses how the Clinton 
Administration purposefully avoided using the word Genocide in an effort to not be forced into 
action due to the UN Convention on Genocide.  He also states the policies of America and other 
powers to limit the scope of the UN peacekeeping mission that was already on the ground had 
the effect of further emboldening those actively slaughtering Tutsi and moderate Hutu during the 
Genocide.29  He goes much further in his later work on the Congo Wars stating that America’s 
lack of attention span and desire to fix a problem and move on with no commitment while 
having tunnel vision on other problems is at the core of American inaction during the Rwandan 
Genocide and both Congo Wars.30 
Klinghoffer looks at American media coverage of the Genocide and shows an inherent 
contradiction in New York Times pieces in which that paper admits that what was happening in 
Rwanda was Genocide but also stating that America had no reason to intervene at all.31  He also 
takes time to address such topics relating to the Clinton Administration such as avoiding saying 
the world Genocide, and that former President Carter felt that at least some of the inaction was 
due to US racism.32  
                                                 
28 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis,  274.   
29 Ibid, 274-5.   
30 Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental 
Catastrophe, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),  xxxv-xxxvi.   
31 Klinghoffer, The International Dimensions of the Rwandan Genocide, 98-100. 
32 Ibid, 158-9. 
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 Mel McNulty’s article on war reporting during the Rwandan Genocide shows great 
similarities to the ideas brought forth by Keim in Mistaking Africa.  He talks about reporting that 
was “characterized by misinterpretation resulting from oversimplification and the related, racist 
tendency to label all conflict in Africa as ‘tribalism,’ by means of which a unique set of political 
circumstances is ethnicized and thus explained away.”33  McNulty goes further in stating that the 
media had it wrong in Rwanda before the Genocide and continued to have it wrong during and 
after the deaths of 800,000 people.  Among the things they got wrong was buying into the notion 
of an ethnic conflict without a political component, believing and pushing the tribalism myth, 
failure to report the findings of NGOs and the head of UNAMIR that something was amiss and 
that weapons were being stockpiled, complicity in France’s own complicity with the 
Habyarimana regime and the interim government by not talking about French ties to those 
administrations, and forcing international aid during the refugee crisis but not doing so during 
the Genocide itself.34 
 Another important article, by Melissa Wall, looking at the Genocide and how American 
media covered it finds that the top five themes of coverage included “irrational tribalism,” 
Rwandans as “barbaric” or “helpless and pathetic,” the violence is so beyond understanding that 
it must be compared to mythological/supernatural/biblical events, “natural disasters or diseases,” 
the countries surrounding Rwanda are just as violent so they cannot help, and the lone possible 
hope is “the West.”35  While Melissa Wall has hit the mark on several of these topics she has 
                                                 
33 Mel McNulty, “Media Ethnicization and the International Response to War and Genocide in Rwanda,” in eds. 
Tim Allen & Jean Seaton, Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence, (New York: 
Zed Books, 1999), 275.   
34 Ibid, 282-4.   
35 Melissa Wall, “An Analysis of New Magazine Coverage of the Rwanda Crisis in the United States,” in ed. Allan 
Thompson The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 265. 
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seemingly missed it as well.  This study has looked at those same magazines and many others 
and while there may be some calls for Western intervention they are virtually buried under the 
weight of “irrational tribal violence” and a lack of understanding of the situation on the ground.  
Many of the calls for Western intervention that were made in print magazines come off as yet 
another facet of paternalism mixed with depicting Africans as incapable of fixing their own 
problems.  It is also telling that those that stopped the Genocide were the same “pathetic and 
helpless” Tutsi who came out of one of those neighboring countries.   
This thesis fits within the parameters of the aforementioned works.  What is different in 
this work is the systematic efforts taken combined with attention to, and influence from, the 
theoretical works of Said and Keim.  By looking at media reports as othering, this thesis strives 
to bring not only more attention to this topic but a more theoretically grounded framework.   
The simple, indeed core, answers to these questions is that the coverage was racially 
charged because America has never understood Africa and their perceptions of Africa are 
clouded by the historical legacies of things like slavery, the African Diaspora, and the European 
scramble for, and carving up of, Africa.  How the coverage was racist was in that Rwandans 
were portrayed in a very similar way to the excuses that the West has used to justify everything 
from slavery to the colonization of Africa.  Rwandans were portrayed, victim and killer, as 
people lacking agency or volition.  Instead they were savages engaged in blood feuds that were 
primordial, pre-modern, lacking of any logical reason, and driven by hatred that was not only of 
the blood but in the blood itself, a veritable DNA strand of hatred in both Hutu and Tutsi.    
As to whether or not this allowed the US government to get away with their chosen 
policy of ignoring and forestalling intervention; there are many answers.  The US was forced to 
intervene when the refugee crisis was front page news, saving killers and innocent victims alike.  
 22 
 
The US government was able to ignore the few NGO voices calling out for intervention as well 
as those within their own ranks doing the same thing during the Genocide.  While proving that if 
the media had been closer to correct with regards to the situation on the ground and less racist 
and paternalist with their coverage would be difficult; it is hard to argue with the fact that the US 
did snap to attention once there were people in need of water, food, and medicine instead of 
those needing to not be chopped to death by machetes.   
Chapter Layout 
Chapter one will lay out not only the historical background of the Rwandan Genocide; it 
also includes a brief primer on Genocide in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as well as a 
look at some of the more major themes in the historiography.  A more in depth historical 
background than what was provided in this introduction is needed as this historical event was 
incredibly complicated and multifaceted.  The primer on other Genocides seeks to allow the 
reader to understand the Rwandan Genocide in a more full, if somewhat scant, historical context 
and provide an understanding of one of the scourges of the modern era.  The larger 
historiography can also be looked at somewhat as a primer.  The proliferation of books on the 
Rwandan Genocide has made understanding the greater movements within the historiography 
more difficult.  Please note that while the works of some, such as the theoretical foundations of 
this work by Said and Keim as well as studies specifically relating to the American media, will 
not be further addressed within the larger historiographical section works of others mentioned in 
this introduction are. 
 Much attention has been paid in the historiography to various factors such as how the 
Genocide was planned and implemented, survivor accounts, international factors ranging from 
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the involvement of France, the United States, the United Nations, and Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), the role of the Church in the Genocide, and many other factors.  While 
there have been studies of American involvement and media involvement at various levels 
(international, internal Rwandan media, and US media) there has not been enough attention paid 
to the interplay between American media and US policy during the Genocide.  Additionally the 
role of racism in American foreign policy is also something that has been touched upon by 
various authors but not fully addressed.   
 This historiographical section will be broken down into many smaller parts.  The 
discussion will open with theoretical texts that have helped inform and shape this project.  From 
there, there will be a move towards those sources that provide general historical background of 
the Rwandan Genocide.  Many of these works are among the most cited and most often 
discussed works on the Rwandan Genocide.  There will then be attention paid to other sources 
that are of particular importance to this work, including works on American activities before, 
during and after the Genocide, the media coverage of the Genocide, and the other international 
players in the region during this time frame, including France, the UN, NGOs, et cetera.   
Following these sections of the historiography will be a discussion of other works on 
Rwanda, primary and secondary sources, that do not fall within any of the main thrusts of this 
topic but need to be at least touched upon, and, if possible, contextualized for this work.  These 
topics will include firsthand accounts not related to the international community (including 
accounts of survivors, eyewitnesses, and perpetrators of the Genocide), the Church, generalized 
works coming from a Rwandan or regional perspective, criminal/legal works on the prosecution 
of accused perpetrators, and other disparate topics.  While none of these topics have direct 
impact upon this study of the Rwandan Genocide and the American government and media or 
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how it impacted the reaction of the rest of the international community all of these works deserve 
at least cursory mention.  It can be easy to forget when working on a very specialized project 
such as this that there is a larger body of writing, scholarly or otherwise, that exists beyond 
narrow parameters.  Ignoring this type of work under normal circumstances can leave gaps in 
knowledge.  When looking at a topic as difficult to address as Genocide there are as many moral 
problems as there are academic ones on this path.   
Chapter two looks at the media articles on the Rwandan Genocide.  They are addressed as 
if they are primary sources.  It starts with more traditional and popular publications such as Time 
before moving onto more specialized magazines designed for more selected audiences.  The list 
of magazines addressed is in no way intended to be exhaustive, as a study of this type with more 
sources could easily double or triple in length quickly. 
Chapter three will sum up the major issues of this work and reframe the arguments of the 
previous chapters.   
Coverage of the Rwandan Genocide, and its connected tragedies, relied upon age old 
Western ideals of racial superiority and African backwardness.  They made a refugee crisis more 
important than a Genocide.  The allowed racism, however covert and unintentional, to deprive a 
nation of assistance while at the same time helping to prop up and give legitimacy to a 
government of thugs.  This legitimacy has worsened the situation to such levels that two other 
wars have been fought due to the Rwandan Genocide and the Rwandan Civil War never being 
fully and satisfactorily resolved.36 
 
 
                                                 
36 Prunier, Africa’s World War.   
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CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND 
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 
A Brief History of Genocide in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries 
In the twentieth century, and into the twenty-first, Genocide has become something of an 
epidemic and a stain upon the fabric of the supposed civility of the modern world.  In what was 
likely the first Genocide of the twentieth century Germans in German Southwestern Africa 
entered into a protracted conflict with, and counter rebellion against, the Herero people of the 
area.  What eventually emerged from an initial rebellion and conflict was a program of forced 
migration and displacement across arid lands in which there was not enough water for all of the 
Herero to survive.37   
The next Genocide actually led to, or tied into, two other Genocides that are less often 
discussed.  The Armenian Genocide came out of similar scientific racism type ideas that led to 
the Holocaust, the Hamatic hypothesis that was used to divide Africa and indirectly caused the 
Rwandan Genocide, and also colored and was colored by ideas of Social Darwinism.  Prior to the 
Great War, Pan Turan societies were popping up in Hungary, Turkey, and other areas with large 
populations of people ethnically tied to Turkic and Finno-Ugrian (or Uralic) language groups.  
The basic idea was that there was an origin point of both of these language groups and that that 
place was a mystical and prehistoric land referred to as Turan.   From Turan, for whatever 
reason, the groups that became everyone from the Ottoman Turks and their linguisto-ethnic 
cousins to Finns, natives of the Ural mountains, and Magyr Hungarians emerged and spread 
across Asia and Europe.  After the fall of the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire the new power was 
                                                 
37 David Maybury-Lewis, “Genocide against Indigenous Peoples,”, in Alexander Laban  Hinton, ed.,  Annihilating 
Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA 2002), pg 48 
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the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), also referred to as the Young Turks.38  The Young 
Turks took an interesting path to achieve secular political power, while its goals were ethno-
political, it couched its efforts in religious unity.   While pursuing a goal of uniting Turkey with 
the various Turkic nationalities in Central Asia and reclaiming Turan its words to other Muslim 
was of Pan Islam, not Pan Turan.   
The Armenians became a target for various reasons.  The majority of the Armenian 
population of the world was situated in the historic Armenian region straddling the border of the 
empires of Turkey and Imperial Russia within the Caucasus.  Russia and Turkey were long 
enemies and were on different sides of the Great War.  Turkish authorities believed that the 
Russians planed to make use of Armenians in the Turkish Armenian as agents of rebellion.39  
Additionally with the slow speed collapse of the formerly great Ottoman Empire there were 
many Islamic peoples fleeing the now freed, majority Christian, and hostile to Muslims of any 
ethnic extraction as agents of the former Ottoman colonial masters’ nation states.  These Muslim 
refugees had to be housed somewhere and a great many of them were housed in Historic 
Armenian regions, where the Armenians were often the majority local population.  Muslim 
refugees seeing Armenian Christians in an Islamic empire not only as a majority ethnic group, 
but as an economically powerful one, created internal tensions.40  These tensions were utilized 
by the Young Turks to single out the Armenians.  There was also another fact of simple 
geography.  A shrinking Turkey that was turning east for its future politically, militarily, 
                                                 
38 Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response, (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2003), pg 166-172, 355.   
39 Vahakn N. Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict, (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishing, 2003), 57-58.   
40 Ibid, 112-3.  For more reading on the Armenian Genocide see Edited by Richard G. Hovannisian, The Armenian 
Genocide in Perspective, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2001) and Robert Melson, Revolution and Genocide: 
On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).   
 27 
 
economically, and culturally had a major roadblock.  Not only was Turkish Armenia between 
Turkey and Turan/Central Asia, but so was Russian Armenia.   
All of these historical factors are compelling but essentially, as with most Genocides, this 
was a combination of racism, scapegoating, and power seeking behavior.  Finding a way to 
redirect not only newly arrived citizens from former colonial territories but also the semi 
nomadic Kurdish populations, while allowing for a scapegoat to unify the disparate ethnic groups 
and still further the goal of Central Asiatic expansion.  While Turkey ended up on the losing side 
of the war they were able to eliminate 1 million, or more, Armenians.41  A combination of 
execution by firing squad, torture, forced migration without adequate supplies or shelter, 
drowning, and other methods were used to perpetrate this Genocide.  Stemming from this time 
and era there were also assaults on the Pontic Greek population within Turkey and the 
Arameans/Syriac  that some have described as Genocide while others refer to them simply as 
slaughter or the perpetrator coined term used so often during the collapse of Yugoslavia, ethnic 
cleansing.42  It should also be noted that as recently as May 2010 that Sweden recognized all of 
these Genocides as such legally.43   
Moving into the 1930s a Politicide or Classicide was perpetrated in the geographically 
and politically isolated Soviet Ukraine.  Characterized as the other by the Soviet party apparatus 
as Kulaks (rich farmers) Ukrainian farmers were forced to collectivize their land and production 
and while growing enough food to feed the majority of the Soviet Union, and even allow for the 
                                                 
41 Samantha Power, “Raising the Cost of Genocide,” in eds. Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner, The New Killing 
Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention, 246. 
42 Sebastian de Courtois, The Forgotten Genocide:  Eastern Christians, the Last Arameans, (Piscataway, NJ: 
Gorgias Press, 2004.  Translated by Vincent Aurora, for Aramean/Syriac Genocide.  For the assault on the Pontic 
Greeks see George Horton, The Blight of Asia, (London: Sterndale Classics, 2003),  and  Jack David Eller, From 
Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1999),  243,  for ethnic cleansing.   
43 http://www.thelocal.se/25468/20100311/#.UUUgYxc4u3g last accessed 3/5/2013.   
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USSR to sell grains on the world market, these so called Kulaks were allowed to starve while 
feeding a burgeoning empire.  The Soviet Union effectively cast all Ukrainian farmers as 
enemies of the state and the party, which were largely one in the same.  The supposed Kulaks 
were dehumanized in the minds of those perpetrators of lower power levels and socially 
recreated as an enemy other, capitalist reactionaries fighting against the proletarian revolution.  
As such it became easier for their executioners to kill them, whether the Kulaks were slowly 
killed by starvation or more rapidly dispatched by other means.44   
The end of the 1930s saw another effort at Genocide on numerous levels with the 
Japanese expansion into greater Asia.  The start of the Asiatic, and earlier, part of World War II 
Japan not only killed tens of thousands of people during the Rape of Nanking but it also sought a 
more indirect path to Genocide, cultural domination, cultural imperialism, and breaking the 
enemy with the comfort women phenomenon.45  These two combined phenomenon have 
ramifications that are still felt today, and occasionally still a political hot button in Asia, but are 
much less discussed both in academic circles and by the general population than the Holocaust. 
The 1940s saw the most famous of Genocides, the Holocaust, based again on Social -
Darwinism/Scientific Racism combined with a quasi-mystical history of the perpetrators.  So 
called Aryan history/ethnicity was contrasted against the contemporaneous situation in Germany, 
that of a defeated nation paying the victors reparations.  The Jewish people of Europe were the 
most visible of targets during this time but some of the first groups to be targeted were those with 
physical and mental disabilities and the Rhineland Blacks, a group of children of mixed ancestry, 
part German and part African, typically the African side coming from colonial subjects of 
                                                 
44 Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine, (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 117-143 
45 Neil J. Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror, (New York: Westview Press, 2002), 3, 36 
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France.  Other groups targeted included homosexuals, Freemasons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, those 
of leftist political leanings, and the Romani (more commonly known as Gypsies, which is 
considered by many to be a racist term).  In total well over 10 million people, and perhaps twice 
that many people, were killed in the Holocaust in the name of a racially pure and dominant 
Germany.46  With so many targets looked at as “others,” many foreign and many domestic the 
Holocaust’s closest comparison would be the various simultaneous Genocides perpetrated by the 
Ottoman Turks on Armenians, Greeks, and other Eastern Christians during the time of the Great 
War.  Little more need be said about the Holocaust as it is one of the more understood topics of 
history within America, if not also one of the most written about topics in the English 
language.47   
The 1950s brought another politically motivated internal Genocide, at least in the minds 
of some, the Great Leap Forward. Similar in scope to the Liquidation of the Kulaks the famines 
resulting from this effort to rapidly industrialize the world’s most populous nation created 
massive internal upheaval and turmoil.  This combined with party directed violence and 
government mismanagement led to the deaths of tens of millions of people.  This party and class 
solidarity driven movement, with its requisite need for loyalty to the state-party apparatus might 
not have been as directed as some Genocides but it was certainly one of most deadly examples in 
terms of sheer numbers.48 
The 1960s are somewhat more controversial as some would call various conflicts within 
Africa as well as the Vietnam War genocidal conflicts.  In the 1970s, the Cambodian 
                                                 
46 Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur 
(Harrisonburg, VA: Yale University Press, 2007), 439-441 
47 Norman G. Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering, (London and 
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Autogenocide, saw internal persecution and in many cases execution of intellectuals, those of the 
former upper classes, and those not of Khmer ethnicity.  Victims were labeled enemies of the 
state, agents of foreign/counter revolutionary forces, and against the party and the revolution by 
the agrarian communist Khmer Rouge.  The Khmer Rouge’s hatred of literacy and education saw 
its ultimate form in the use of schools as prison camps and extermination sites.  Well over 1 
million people died as a result of this Genocide.49   
The 1980s were much calmer, though some scholars and activists have argued for various 
conflicts being genocidal in nature.  The 1990s saw a return of Genocide in force with not only 
the Rwandan Genocide but also large scale ethnic conflict in the collapsing Yugoslavia, the end 
of the genocidal efforts in East Timor, and the start of the Congo Wars.  The collapse of 
Yugoslavia with its multipart, multi-front nature has always been difficult to understand, even 
for scholars.  The main atrocities that are to be considered as far as Genocide is concerned are 
the Serbian efforts to perpetrate “ethnic cleansing” on Croats and Bosnian Muslims and the 
associated efforts such as mass executions, hidden mass graves, rape rooms where women of 
those ethnicities were taken to be tortured and raped as an effort to shame them and their 
families, and the long term shelling of civilian populations, often under the nose of UN 
peacekeepers including American forces.50  The historical and cultural reasons that influenced 
this tragedy include ethnic groups that were once the same but converted to different religions 
and the feeling among other groups of collaboration due to those religious affiliations.  Bosnian 
Muslims are obviously Muslim and these conversions often took place during Ottoman rule, 
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Serbs were primarily eastern Orthodox and had strong ties to Russia due to their coreligionist 
and Slavic connections, while Croats are predominantly Catholic and that affiliation is often tied 
to Austro-Hungarian imperialism in the area.  All of these religious ties also seemed to, in part at 
least, have geographic components with more Serbs in the east, more Croats closer to Italy and 
Austria, and Muslims spread throughout.51   
With the collapse of the Communist Bloc and the desire for independence by other 
Yugoslav ethnicities and the desire for continued dominance by the Serbs conflict erupted 
quickly and on many fronts.  Ethnic militias formed and large swaths of the former Yugoslavia 
were under siege.  This conflict escalated to a level that the UN was forced to step in, even 
though no such mass involvement was forthcoming for Rwanda during the same period of time.  
Eventually the Serbs were pushed out of many areas and the war ground to a halt, but not before 
destroying politically, culturally, and on economic and material levels what was once one nation 
that became many nations.52 
The wars in Congo that have led to many different forms of mass killing were in some 
ways echoes of the Rwandan refugee crisis.  Hutu militias and former Rwanda military personnel 
were still highly armed, living in Zaire, and acting as a combination of government in exile and a 
collection of local thuggish warlords.  As they came into conflict with indigenous Tutsi 
population Rwanda decided to enter the conflict.  As time went on various African governments 
and rebel forces entered into the conflict until a bloodbath of huge proportions and many sides 
was the reality for the former Zaire for many years.  With various groups from within and 
outside Zaire-Congo this conflict saw atrocities coming from many quarters, some of them 
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directed for ethno-political reasons while others were seemingly only about power and not even 
couched in racist language.53 
Moving into the twenty-first century ethnic conflict continued in the Congo while Darfur 
became the cause célèbre.  Darfur was another case, at least in part, of a societal construct being 
used to define the “other,” Black Muslims killing other Black Muslims due to the fact that the 
group doing the killing believes it has Arabic heritage and is therefore superior to their victims 
and deserving of domination over them while the victims are deserving of nothing save torture, 
subjugation, and/or death. 54   Even for all of the media and popular culture attention brought to 
the Genocide in Darfur little real action was taken, showing that even a concerted media effort 
cannot fully drive government policy, but at least there was some chance of action, whereas with 
Rwanda there was seemingly none. 
The 1948 Genocide Convention and the Question of was Rwanda a Genocide? 
According to the Genocide Convention of 1948 Genocide’s most simple definition is the 
attempt, in whole or in part to eliminate a specific ethnic group.  This means that if a group is 
targeted for elimination specifically because it is an ethnic group then that is Genocide.55  While 
some may argue that there is no difference between Tutsi and Hutu due to their shared language 
and centuries of intermarriage the situation on the ground was that Hutu and Tutsi perceived 
themselves as different and ethnic identity cards were the norm.  In many ways the daily lives of 
Tutsi and Hutu in late twentieth century Rwanda before the Genocide were incredibly similar, 
aside from the periodic ethnic clash.   
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There are many reasons that this was not simple ethnic strife.  The Interhamwe were 
trained, armed, indoctrinated and coached to target Tutis and to a lesser extent enemy Hutu.  
They were trained to look for ethnic identity cards.  The radio broadcast on RTML and other 
outlets were put together to play on slang, popular culture, and long and short term ethnic slurs 
and code words to embolden killers and direct traffic.  Additionally lists were drawn up to target 
directly Tutsi as well as moderate Hutu that might stand in the way of the Genocide.  There was 
also a tremendous effort put forth to obfuscate the facts, sell the international community on the 
narrative of a double Genocide, and to use their rotating position on the UN Security Council to 
not only delay action but to keep the interim government apprised of what the UN and the great 
powers were thinking day to day.  Rwanda’s rotating position on the UN Security Council started 
in January 1994, three months before the Genocide began.56 
 Other reasons to call what happened in Rwanda in 1994 a Genocide are often post facto 
reasoning.  Nevertheless many of these notions are compelling.  There have been numerous 
people convicted of Genocide both within the Rwandan court system and at the ICTR in 
Arusha.57  The United Nations, United States, France, and various other nations have declared 
that the extermination of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 was a Genocide.  The last set of sources that 
prove the Genocide are the words of victims, survivors, witnesses, and perpetrators.  While many 
accused genocidaires deny their part in the Genocide enough have come forward admitting their 
complicity, for whatever reason.  Additionally, enough survivors and witnesses have described 
events that there is sufficient documentary evidence to make a case for something that goes far 
beyond ethnic unrest.   
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 Historical Background of the Rwandan Genocide 
 Prior to the arrival of Europeans the portion of the African Great Lakes region that was to 
become Rwanda and Burundi, along with small regions in neighboring countries, had three 
ethnic groups within it.  These groups are believed to have arrived in a successive order with the 
new arrivals eventually gaining a modicum of control over the previous inhabitants each time.  
Over time small kingdoms formed under local power structures and these kingdoms went 
through a process of combination, conquest, absorption, growth, and decline.  The Twa (Batwa) 
are widely believed to be the first inhabitants of Rwanda and Burundi.  They are a pygmy group 
of hunter-gatherers.  During the Bantu migration the Hutu (Bahutu) came into the area.  Over 
time they pushed Twa into, or further into, the forest of the mountains and hills of the area.  The 
Hutu also over time and waves of migration became the dominant ethnic group of the area and 
their population outstripped that of the Twa.  The local language of Rwanda is Kinyarwanda, 
which is a Bantu language.  The Hutu were predominantly an agricultural society.  Eventually 
the Tutsi (Batutsi) migrated into this area.  There are multiple theories as to the origins of the 
Tutsi, who were a pastoralist group predominantly.  As they slowly assimilated into the area they 
took on the local language and took over some, but not all areas of present day Rwanda and 
Burundi.58   
 Among the more popular origin ideas for the Tutsi are the Hamitic Hypothesis, which 
supposes that they are somehow tied to the Biblical story of Noah and descended from his son 
Ham.  This theory has helped form others like the idea that the Tutsi are originally from either 
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the Ethiopian highlands or Egypt.59  Other ideas include an origin as a different Bantu group that 
entered Rwanda later than the Hutu or that they were a political and economic group that evolved 
into an ethnicity fully after the arrival of Europeans in the area with a large amount of push from 
those Europeans to create an ethnic group where none existed before.   
 In late 1800s Europeans first entered what is now Rwanda and came into contact with its 
population.  At the time most of modern Rwanda was a single kingdom ruled by a Tutsi king.  
This king had various vassals, many of them also Tutsi who governed smaller areas in his stead 
on a day to day basis.  In the area that became Rwanda there were also smaller areas that were 
more locally governed, some of which were ruled by Tutsi and some by Hutu.  As Germany 
came to dominate this area the smaller kingdoms were absorbed into the already extant Rwandan 
kingdom and incorporated into its pre-existing governmental system which was subverted for 
European purposes.   
 After the loss in the Great War by the Central Powers, Rwanda-Burundi became a 
League of Nations mandate territory that was run by and incorporated into the Belgian colonial 
system within Africa.  Over time the system of ethnic identity was hardened into a rigid one 
involving identity paperwork that stated the official “ethnicity,” but was also somewhat mutable.  
The ethnic delineation of Tutsi involved owning at least ten cows regardless of what ethnicity 
one was.  Tutsi were favored by the Belgian colonial government and had various advantages in 
regards to education and the possibility of government employment.  There was also a tendency 
to favor Tutsi within the Church. This favoritism was akin to Britain’s system of colonial 
management in which different ethnic, religious, and other groups were turned against each other 
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by favoring some and oppressing others.  In this way colonial subjects cannot unite against the 
colonial occupier.  This system put the majority Hutu, who made up some 80% or more of the 
population at a distinct disadvantage.  Additionally within Rwanda and Burundi other smaller 
kingdoms, some of them with Hutu power structures were consumed and incorporated in the two 
larger kingdoms that went on to become the nations of Rwanda and Burundi.  
 After World War II and with the coming of decolonization there was an eventual shift in 
the colonial administration, and for that matter religious administration, in Rwanda. A shift 
occurred towards favoring the Hutu majority as Belgium sought to keep their influence in the 
region after Rwanda became independent.  This movement was contemporary to a rising sense of 
Hutu nationalism in which many Hutu felt that Tutsi were foreign invaders akin to the Belgians 
and the Germans before them.  This idea was reinforced by decades of theories on the origins of 
the Tutsi, questions of how they came to power, and the scientific racism that was so popular in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.   
 As decolonization was close at hand in 1959 the Hutu attempted to assassinate the Tutsi 
king and slaughtered tens of thousands of Tutsi.  The king and many other Tutsi also went into 
exile.  When Rwanda gained independence in 1962 it was essentially a state run by the Hutu 
political-ethnic group for itself.  The Twa had long since been marginalized and made up around 
1% of the population.  The Tutsi made up only 15% of the population.  They were politically 
marginalized and often subject to discrimination, lower social status, problems attaining 
education especially as compared to the majority of the colonial period, and periodic outbursts of 
anti-Tutsi violence that could end in anything from low levels of injury to high death tolls and 
more Tutsi flight from Rwanda into neighboring nations or areas further afield.  Rather quickly 
Rwanda became an one party state and the militant Hutu government actively suppressed 
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opposition parties, the return of Tutsi refugees, any Tutsi rebellions -real or perceived -, and any 
other threats that it saw to its one party ethno-political rule that was predicated on Hutu 
supremacy, punishing the Tutsi for invading Hutu lands in the dark recesses of Rwandan oral 
tradition - though before any written history of Rwanda -, and keeping a status quo.   
 This government lasted until the rise from the ranks of the military of Juvenal 
Habyarimana.  A Hutu from the north with ties to one of the most powerful families from a 
region of northern Rwanda that escaped Tutsi political control until after the coming of 
Europeans, Habyarimana seized control in 1973 and while initially more conciliatory towards the 
Tutsis within a year he reversed course leading to another series of attacks on Tutsi and further 
governmental, educational, and social alienation.  This also sparked yet another round of Tutsi 
flight to nations like Uganda.60 
In 1990, having been in power for seventeen years, Habyarimana faced a major challenge 
to his rule and to Hutu power within Rwanda.  A rebel force, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, 
moved into Rwanda from Uganda with an army, the Rwandan Patriotic Army, intent on at least 
gaining some political power for Tutsis, moving away from a one party system, and allowing 
exiles to come home to Rwanda.  This force was composed of a large number of Tutsi, with 
some Hutu members, and it had years of military experience as part of the anti-Milton Obote 
National Resistance Army in Uganda.  Many future members of the RPF then served in the 
government army in Uganda while also laying the groundwork for and creating the RPF.61   
The October 1990 invasion of Rwanda was not initially very successful and the leader of 
the RPF was killed in the early days of the invasion.  Paul Kagame returned from a military 
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training course in the United States to lead the RPF forces and managed to calm the confusion 
reigning in the RPF ranks.  He then led the RPF in a battle plan that was more about keeping his 
opponent guessing and on their toes than any real major gains.  This started a process of peace 
deals that would lead to the final round of Arusha Accords in late 1993.  In between these times 
other political parties sprang up in Rwanda and Habyarimana’s group, the opposition parties, 
fake opposition parties that were really just more extreme militant Hutu groups, and the RPF 
were all to share in power until regular elections could be held.   
It was during this period that Habyarimana felt pressure from all sides.  
Moderate/opposition Hutu groups were not likely to vote him back into power nor were those 
that supported the RPF, Tutsi or otherwise.  His followers were disillusioned with the prospect of 
allowing Tutsi back into the government and his wife, Agathe - who some have posited was the 
real force behind his rise to power, and her clique, the Akuzu,62 were also not only not happy 
with the situation but were already acting against Tutsi interests in many ways.  From the 
training and arming of the Interahamwe, a militia force trained to act as one and target Tutsi and 
noncompliant (read moderate and or opposition) Hutu to the radio station RTLM which 
broadcast thinly veiled messages before the Genocide instructing its Hutu listeners to eliminate 
the cockroaches, or inyenzi, which was a derisive term for Tutsi.  The orders became even less 
thinly veiled after the Genocide started and RTLM was even directing traffic telling its listeners 
areas where Tutsis were still believed to be alive.63   
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President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and the President of Burundi Cyprien 
Ntaryamira were flying into Kigali on the night on April 6th, 1994.  Their plane was shot down 
and both men, along with others on the plane, were killed.64  Within hours of the assassination 
the Rwandan military blocked United Nations observers from the site of the plane crash and the 
Genocide started within hours of the plane crash.  Among the targets, aside from Tutsi, the Prime 
Minister elect of the government to be implemented due to the Arusha accords was targeted and 
slain to prevent her from coming to power.  Belgian peacekeepers were also slaughtered at 
around the same time. 
From April 6th through the end of the Genocide approximately one hundred days later 
800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed in the Rwandan Genocide.65  Deaths were often a 
result of machete wounds with torture, rape, beatings, small arms, and explosives also used as 
methods of death.  Most of the targets were Tutsi who were easily identified due to the ethnically 
particular identity cards used by the population and created by the government.  Many of those 
killed were killed by the Interahamwe while others involved in the slaughter included civilians, 
police officers, government officials, military forces, church officials, teachers, and local 
politicians.  The two main methods of finding targets were hunting them down at locations the 
victims were known to be at or places they had hidden or the checkpoint method.  The police, 
military, and Interahamwe set up checkpoints at certain points such as roadways and in front of 
important buildings, checking identity cards.  This method was particularly effective in finding 
those Tutsi, and moderate Hutu, those that escaped notice or their original hunters.  Lists of 
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targets were drawn up before the Genocide started and named targets could and did slip through 
the net, at least initially and some of them even survived the Genocide in toto.66  
 The United Nations was warned about the possibility of the arming of Interahamwe 
militia and the stockpiling of weapons well before the Genocide started.  The Belgians sought a 
total withdrawal and attempted to get their allies including the United States and the United 
Kingdom on their side.  After losing their own troops in a nation that they were once the colonial 
master of and seeking to withdraw without a full United Nations pull out would make Belgium 
look impotent.  A full UN withdraw would give them cover and show that the international 
community also believed that the situation was untenable.67   
 The UN would eventually come around but they could not find any takers for a 
peacemaking effort in Rwanda considering the peacekeeping efforts failing, the restarting of the 
Civil War, and the start of Genocide.  Only France was willing to get involved on their own 
terms.   
French reaction was that of a paternalist nation seeking to assist its client state.  After 
arming the Rwandan government and its proxies and seeing the tide of the Civil War turn against 
that government after the onset of the Genocide, France had to do something to stem the tide.  
Seeing that its allies wanted nothing to do with the situation for various reasons but that there 
was cause to intervene and at least some UN support for an intervention France got the UN to 
acquiesce to Operation Turquoise which was a French “humanitarian” intervention that helped 
corral the Hutu refugees that were departing Rwanda ahead of the RPF advance for fear of 
reprisals for the Genocide, a fear that the Rwandan government and its unofficial propaganda 
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wing RTLM was more than happy to play up to increase the size of the refugee population.  The 
larger the refugee population the more difficult it would be to track down the perpetrators and 
planners of the Genocide and the more legitimacy the government going into exile would have 
with the international community, at the diplomatic bargaining table , and with the NGOs 
flooding into neighboring countries to assist with the crisis.68   
The American reaction to the Rwandan Genocide was one tempered by the recent failure 
in Somalia of a peacemaking mission, the sheer number of humanitarian crises occurring in the 
late 1990s, and a world in which America was the lone standing superpower.  America was also 
an ally of Belgium and of France, who both had differing but not mutually exclusive goals 
involving Rwanda, no matter what America’s connections to the then leader of the RPF and 
current President of Rwanda Paul Kagame.69  
By mid August the RPF and its military wing the RPA had won the day, but at a terrible 
cost.  Millions of Rwandans, many Hutu but with some Tutsi and Twa mixed in had fled the 
country for neighboring countries like Burundi and Tanzania but the vast majority of them ended 
up in the Kivu area of the then Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Despite fighting 
against the Interahamwe, forces of the deposed and exiled government, and at times with French 
peacekeeping forces of Operation Turquoise, the rebel RPF had gained control of Rwanda and 
stopped the Genocide that the entire world stood by and allowed to happen, while coming up 
with excuses as to why intervention was either not needed or could not happen as fast as was 
necessary. 
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The refugee crisis, particularly in the former Zaire, was the next stage in this tragedy that 
the international community, Rwanda, and all of its neighbors had to deal with. This was all the 
more problematic due to the presence in Kivu of the Banyamulenge minority, a Tutsi population 
that had long lived in the now Democratic Republic of Congo.  This population became a focus 
of attacks by militant parts of the Hutu refugees, who were also staging attacks into Rwanda.  
This, along with already extant political, social, and economic problems, led to some of the 
Banyarmulenge to ally with the RPF, other regional powers, and other rebel groups to overthrow 
the sitting government in one civil war, which led to another civil war.  These Congo Wars have 
been described by Gerard Prunier as Africa’s World War.  During these conflicts all sides 
committed various atrocities, including rumors of cannibalism being used as a weapon against a 
population of pygmies in Congo.  The death toll of these wars, civilian and military, numbers in 
the millions, involved various African governments and rebel/extra-governmental forces, and 
continues to destabilize the region to this day.   
Historiography 
 One of the seminal works in scholarship of the Rwandan Genocide is Gerard Prunier’s 
The Rwanda Crisis.70  This work, which in its second edition, was expanded to look further into 
developments coming out of the refugee camps post Genocide and post Rwandan Civil War.  
Prunier has become so involved not only in the Great Lakes region of Africa but also in 
scholarship involving Genocide in Africa that he has written two subsequent books on the 
topic.71  The main thrust of The Rwanda Crisis is that there are no arcane and mystical reasons 
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for the Genocide.  There is no prehistoric reason for the slaughter.  Instead there were calculated 
steps taken by those in power and those that wished to be in power to prevent a power sharing 
agreement at any cost.  While they may have used the myths of Rwandan “history” to manipulate 
others and while some may have believed those myths themselves the real motivation was a 
desire for political and military power through ethnic division and ethnic slaughter.72 
 Another work that is often cited is Arthur Jay Klinghoffer’s International Dimensions of 
the Rwandan Genocide.  Primarily a political science tome this work looks mostly at the failure 
of the international community to intervene during the Civil War and Genocide and discusses 
some of the ramifications for that internationally, regionally, and in Rwanda proper.73  He shows 
how the situation in Rwanda destabilized the region.74 
 Alain Destexhe’s Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century is another work that 
covers the basic background of the situation in Rwanda before and during the Genocide.  While 
working from a somewhat comparative model invoking the Holocaust as similar to the Rwandan 
Genocide Destexhe shows that the international community did not do its job and how 
humanitarianism and moral relativism combined with great power obstructionism and 
uninformed media coverage to all for a Genocide to continue unabated.75  That Destexhe called 
for “Belgium, France and the United States” to “accept a degree of responsibility for the 
genocide”76 in a book written mere months after the halt of the Genocide shows that he was 
already well versed in the ins and outs of the sleight of hand that was being used by Western 
governments to avoid stopping the Genocide and France’s large scale of complicity in it.  His 
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final thought on the Genocide shows how far from reason and humanity Western governments 
were on this issue. 
Where justice and reason are lacking, the human solidarity that replaces them, such as was displayed at 
Goma-but too late to save the victims of genocide-is worth nothing.  It is the moral responsibility of each 
one of us, citizens of this planet, to contribute something to prevent this unique event from being forgotten, 
even before it has been properly recognized.77   
 
American 
 Samantha Power’s A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide is one of the 
books that more directly addresses how America has dealt with Genocide in the twentieth 
century.  Power shows a Clinton Administration that was very unconcerned with the Rwandan 
Genocide, noting that “President Clinton did not convene a single meeting of his senior foreign 
policy advisers to discuss U.S. options for Rwanda.”78  As early as April 8th, 1994, less than a 
week into the Genocide Prudence Bushnell, Assistant Secretary of State on African Affairs at the 
time, made public comments about the situation in Rwanda that fell on deaf ears, those of her 
colleagues in the Clinton Administration and the American media, about the violence in Rwanda. 
Few save Bushnell seemed to understand what was taking place.  “Neither Journalists nor 
officials in the United States were focused on the Tutsi.”79  Power also says that no matter what 
issues were occurring within the Washington intelligence community “the reports from Rwanda 
were severe enough to distinguish Hutu killers from ordinary combatants in civil war.”80  The 
general tone of Power’s chapter on Rwanda is one of derision of the media second and the 
                                                 
77 Ibid, 75. 
78 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, (New York: Perennial, 2003), 335. 
79 Ibid, 351-2.   
80 Ibid, 354.   
 45 
 
Clinton Administration first.  There was little done and those things that were done were what 
amounted to totems, symbolic more than effective.81 
 One Hundred Days of Silence is another work dealing wholly with US involvement, or 
the lack thereof in the Genocide.  The author Jared Cohen was even able to have Bushnell write a 
brief foreword for the book. Cohen covers a great many topics and interviews many of the 
people involved in the American policy apparatus during this time.  The main thrust of his book 
can be summed up in this quotation. 
The U.S. refusal to intervene in the Rwanda [sic] genocide was blatant and obvious.  While at the time 
many policymakers were influenced by the Somalia legacy, the marginal importance of Rwanda when 
compared with other pressing issues around the globe, and the varying opinions about what exactly was 
occurring in Rwanda, no policy maker could deny that their [sic] were hundreds of thousands of deaths 
taking place at a rapid pace.  If one looks at the outcome of the Rwand [sic] genocide, it is obvious that 
neither the United States, nor the international community wanted to intervene.  However, what is even 
more shocking is the unwillingness to discuss Rwanda at senior levels.82   
 
This echoes the sentiments of Power and concisely sums up not only Cohen’s ideas on the 
Rwandan Genocide but those of a great many people that have studied this event.  There was no 
reason to act as it was not in America’s limited interests to do so.   
International/NGO/UN 
 One of the earliest reports on the international factors in the Genocide comes from 
OXFAM.  In it they lay out a fairly explicit case for the West, including France and the United 
States helping to arm the Habyarimana regime.  While for the US it was $600,000 in 1993, 
France was responsible for more than $6 million dollars in military aid.83   
 Alan J. Kuperman’s The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention takes a similarly strong 
approach to the report by Vassal-Adams for OXFAM.  He examines how various internal and 
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external factors contributed to the Genocide and the internationals community’s muted response.  
On US policy relating to peacekeeping and Genocide Kuperman states that there are two 
antithetical notions that in cases like Rwanda create a stagnation that is deadly.  One notion is 
that of peacekeepers should not be put on the ground while a civil war is still active.  The other 
idea is that Genocide must be stopped.  These ideas cannot be compatible in a world where most 
Genocides occur within countries instead of across borders.84  This is largely a policy driven 
work coming from the Brookings Institute and as such is similar to the OXFAM book in that it is 
looking for ways to make improvements in international responses as well as to document what 
happened.   
Kuperman states that the initial reporting on the Genocide was flawed and may have 
damaged policy makers’ abilities to discern what was happening due to the ideas that a two way 
civil war was occurring instead of a Genocide, that early death tolls were underreported and 
depicted as a slowing down of violence after the initial bursts of slaughter, most of the reporting 
centered on the capital, Kigali, and that it took weeks for anyone in the media or NGOs to call 
the killings Genocide.85  On the American media, and Western media in general, Kuperman says 
that the media withdrawal with other Westerners was particularly harmful when it happened due 
to that being the height of the killings.86  He also states that after being hesitant to report Rwanda 
as a Genocide, Western media has since been more likely to call any slaughter a Genocide, 
whether it is one or not.87 
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 Returning to foreign policy involving Rwanda Kuperman puts a large amount of blame 
on the international community for forcing democracy and power sharing on the extremist Hutu 
government of Rwanda and believes that by setting up a system where elimination of the enemy 
was the only viable option for staying in power they helped cause the Genocide.   
Had the international community intended to promote genocide, it could hardly have devised a better 
strategy.  The clear lesson is that the best way to stop genocide is not military intervention after the fact but 
wise diplomacy that prevents genocide from starting in the first place.88 
 
France 
 France’s hand in the Genocide in Rwanda has largely been covered by authors such as 
Prunier, Klinghoffer, and Destxhe, among others.  Daniela Kroslak takes a more focused 
approach, looking at French efforts to arm the Habyarimana regime and to prop up the interim 
government after his death.  She shows that France not only took the wrong path before and 
during the Genocide but they have chosen an alternate wrong path from that of England and 
America post Genocide.  While the US and the UK have allowed a great many excesses by the 
RPF controlled regime in Kigali, France has done its best to remain aloof and refuses to issue the 
apologies that other nations did after the RPF stopped the slaughter.  Beyond her detailing of 
French misdeeds and their mishandling of the political situation after the Genocide, Kroslak 
shows a France that was deeply involved in the Genocide by doing all it could to aid the 
perpetrators before, during and after the bloodletting.89   
 The other main title dealing with French complicity in the Genocide is much more 
damning.  In Silent Accomplice, Andrew Wallis, an investigative reporting, states that not only 
did the genocidal Interim Government have strong ties to France but that it was formed in the 
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French Embassy in Kigali.  He further goes on to state that France’s initial reaction after the 
death of President Habyarimana and the onset of the Genocide was to immediately evacuate 
French citizens.  “The French plainly knew within hours of the crash that genocide, or at least 
killing on an unprecedented scale, was underway.”90  They possessed everything from traditional 
and electronic intelligence information to direct ties to the new regime.  Said new regime was 
assembled in the French Embassy.91 
Legal 
 There is no single prevailing trend currently among books dealing with the legal issues 
involving the Rwandan Genocide.  While there is a good amount of literature on the subject it 
seems to be split into two camps.  The first camp comes from the earlier branch of the subject 
involving the International Tribunal at Arusha, Tanzania.  The second grouping looks at the 
reinstitution and repurposing of the old Gacaca system to deal with internal Rwandan trials 
involving Genocidaires.   
 When looking at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) two books of 
are of utmost importance, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and International 
Criminal Practice.  The book specifically dealing with the ICTR is more accessible to academics 
that do not have a legal background, has more historical analysis, and is not a primary source 
with some minor legal comments as International Criminal Practice is.  Neither book offers 
much help in dealing with issues of US policy during the Genocide or media coverage of it, but 
                                                 
90 Andrew Wallis, Silent Accomplice,  210.   
91 Ibid.   
 49 
 
when looking not only at the ICTR but at Rwanda’s internal high court, as opposed to the 
Gacaca system, these books are very valuable to scholars of the Rwandan Genocide.92   
 When looking at the Gacaca system that has become so important in alleviating the 
backlog of Rwanda’s court system since the Genocide there are two books to consider.  Justice 
on the Grass and Rwanda’s Gamble both look at the use of Gacaca courts to address the backlog 
of cases and incarcerated persons and provide healing to the victims, the relatives of victims, and 
survivors of the Genocide  Justice on the Grass looks largely at the trial of three journalists tied 
to the hate radio station that was used to incite the Genocide.  It also veers into political and 
journalistic issues involving the case, Gacaca courts, and freedom of speech and the press.  The 
main ideas behind Rwanda’s Gamble are how the system works, why it is appropriate, and how 
this type of a court system can not only be effective as a tool of punishment but also to heal the 
wounds of the Genocide.93 
Firsthand Accounts 
 One of the heroes to emerge from the Genocide, Paul Rusesabagina, wrote an 
autobiography that deals largely with his efforts to save himself, his neighbors, and others that 
were potential victims of the Genocide.  This work offers wonderful insight into not only the on 
the ground situation within Rwanda but also shows some of the motivations and actions of 
interim government officials during this time period.  While this work does not delve into this 
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book, it is a useful contextual reference for those wishing to obtain a more nuanced view of the 
actions occurring in Rwanda at the time.94   
 Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak is one of the more interesting works on 
the Rwandan Genocide.  It offers little of use to the topics of American media and American 
reactions during the Genocide but it is a fascinating look into the mind of those that carried out 
the Genocide.95  A similar firsthand account that does not have as much moral baggage is 
Surviving the Slaughter, which shows the journey of a Hutu refugee during the Rwandan Civil 
War into the refugee camps in the former Zaire and beyond.96  Neither of these books are studied 
in depth in this thesis though they are both part of the growing literature that seems intent on 
showing the view of the other side of the Genocide.  While it is infrequent at best that scholars, 
journalists, and officials writing on this subject matter completely ignore the atrocities of the 
RPF committed before, during, and after the Genocide, and many have spent a great deal of 
effort trying to explain why ordinary Rwandans took part in the Genocide, it does provide a stark 
contrast to much of the other literature in the field, however unsettling it may be.  
A different level of disturbing firsthand accounts comes from a work describing and 
analyzing artwork done by children that witnessed and survived the Genocide.  This book 
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provides notion of material importance to this study but it does give the reader pause when 
thinking about what the life of Genocide survivors, particularly child survivors, is like.97   
Other firsthand accounts of the Genocide include Land of a Thousand Hills.  This work 
gives very little detail into the situation on the ground as the author was an US national that was 
evacuated during the early part of April 1994.  The rest of her account is that of someone 
watching the news during the event from afar.98  A similar book, from a French expatriate point 
of view is The Shadow of Imana, which is not a direct recollection but rather the author asking 
questions of witnesses while travelling around Rwanda after the Genocide.99  Neither of these 
works gives much of an account of the American government or media involvement though they 
do provide good outsider on the ground style information.   
 Another facet of the firsthand accounts in the blending of scholarly or investigative works 
with firsthand accounts.  This trend, which is only slightly historiographical is yielding 
fascinating results.  Works by Josias Semujanga, John A. Berry & Carol Pott Berry, and Louise 
Mushikiwabo combine firsthand accounts and scholarship into a synthesis that provides insider 
perspectives into the Genocide with a bit of scholarly rigor.100 
The Churches and Religious Matters 
` There is another trend in writings on the Rwandan Genocide, one that involves the study 
of religion, whether from a scholarly perspective or otherwise.  There were many people within 
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the various faiths in Rwanda, particularly the Catholic Church, that were involved in the 
Genocide in some way, whether as victim, survivor, perpetrator, attempted or successful savior 
of targets of Genocide, or mere witnesses.  Clergy or not, religion played a factor in the 
Genocide and in the processes of reconstructing lives and a nation that followed for a great many 
people.  The Civil War and Genocide touched the lives of almost everyone in Rwanda in some 
way.  As such it is not surprising that some turned to religious organizations for help, no matter 
what role they played in the tragedy.   
 The anthology Genocide in Rwanda: Complicity of the Churches? touches on many 
aspects of the Genocide and the effects, positive and negative, that various churches had on this 
event.  Among the various articles there is a common thread “words do more to incite genocide 
than to prevent or stop it.”101  Aside from that idea there are various articles throughout the book 
discussing issues involving churches and the Rwandan Genocide from firsthand accounts and 
more detached views.  This book, like others to be discussed comes from a deeply Christian 
point of view in most cases.   
 Left to Tell is an account by a Tutsi survivor of the Rwandan Genocide.  While it could 
have been listed in the firsthand account section it seemed more fitting here.  While there is 
much information available in this book for scholars and non-academics alike to digest from a 
survivor’s account this book in many ways is about religion and how the author used her faith to 
survive the Genocide and move on with her life.102  Another work by John Rucyahana shows a 
similar trajectory.  Mr. Rucyahana is a Bishop in Rwanda and while much of his book is about 
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the power of faith to heal wounds and forgive ills he does take some time to castigate, however 
politely, Madeleine Albright in particular and the Clinton Administration in general for their 
efforts of obfuscation.103   
 As many of the articles in Rwanda: Complicity of the Churches are not scholarly in 
nature and the other two books addressed are certainly coming from a very religious viewpoint 
there is not a great deal of academic rigour in these works.  The historiographic and literary trend 
is one of churches doing too little during the Genocide and being a key to the healing process 
afterwards.  Beyond the religious issues involved there are many things that can be gleaned from 
these works from an historical perspective if one reads against the grain.   
Historigraphic Trends 
 There have been various trends within the literature and a great deal of cross pollination 
of ideas between different fields.  Among the important trends biographical and autobiographical 
writing has been at the forefront.  Literature from survivors and perpetrators of the Genocide, aid 
workers and military personnel, as well as journalist memoirs among other biographical topics 
have been manifold in this topic of study.  Beyond that trend has been an incredibly large amount 
of work done by political scientists and historians detailing various international factors 
regarding everything from arming the genocidal regime to reasons for the relative lack of an 
international response.  Within that stream of literature the works of Prunier and Klinghoffer are 
very influential and often cited, while others like Melvern and Powers have certainly influenced 
how the Rwandan Genocide is framed, both within academic and non-academic circles.  There 
have also been various attempts to explain the reasons why the Genocide occurred, focusing on 
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internal and external motivations.  Among these studies Mahmood Mamdani’s When Victims 
Become Killers is both seminal and controversial, for its stance that can be perceived as a 
justification for the Genocide due to previous historical wrongdoing committed by Rwandan 
Tutsi when they were in power.104   
The other trends in the literature, such as studies on NGOs, legal issues, and religious 
issues within the Genocide have all been previously addressed.  The overall trend within the 
literature seems to be one of diversity in both topic and methodology with many works 
branching off in various smaller topics as more is written about the Genocide.   
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CHAPTER TWO: TOO FEW VOICES; TOO MANY DISTRACTIONS; 
THE AMERICAN MEDIA AND THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 
 
 In 1994, over a period of less than four months, 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were 
slaughtered during the Rwandan Genocide.105  While there was media coverage of this Genocide 
in America it could barely be called adequate.  Additionally it was not until the refugee situation 
that the American Government decided to act.  In some cases reporters seemed less interested in 
calling for American or Western action than those that wrote letters to the magazines did.  Did 
other news stories occurring contemporaneous to the Genocide push Rwanda from the picture?  
Is there anything in the language used by reporters that reflects the priority level of the Genocide, 
or for that matter the desire of reporters and/or editors to truly understand Rwanda?  Was 
Rwanda looked at as a modern country, with its own problems, history, and society or an exotic 
and distant charnel house, where ancient tribal hatred and chthonic blood feuds ruled the day?  
Were Rwandans portrayed as sub-humans that were incapable of handling their own problems in 
any way other than slaughtering entire populations over political disputes?  Was the language 
used in describing Rwanda conducive to convincing average Americans that this story, one of 
Genocide and Civil War, one that they should care about in any meaningful way?  Why did the 
refugee crisis attract more attention than the Genocide?  These questions will be addressed by 
looking at various mainstream American periodicals in the period during and shortly after the 
Rwandan Genocide.   
 This chapter has multiple sections.  Following this introduction there will be a timeline of 
the history of Rwanda, focusing on, but not limited to, the Genocide.  Following that there will 
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be a brief look at books written by Western investigative journalists after the Genocide to 
attempt to ascertain whether or not notions of “tribalism” and “ancient hatreds” continued to be 
promulgated after the Genocide ended.  Then there will be a section on more mainstream print 
magazines followed by sections detailing the works looking at more left and right leaning 
publications.    
Investigative Journalistic Books Written after the Genocide 
 Fergal Keane, already by the time of the Rwandan Genocide an extremely experienced 
African correspondent, illustrates some of the problems with the reporting of this Genocide.  “I 
was too preoccupied with the dramatic events unfolding in South Africa to give the matter 
anything more than cursory attention.”106  These words reflect his thoughts immediately after the 
deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda ignited ethno-political tensions, turning them 
into Genocide.  He goes on to explain how the pictures and video clips coming out of Rwanda in 
the early stages of the Genocide were received by reporters and other Westerners in South Africa 
and why he feels this reception occurred.   
The general consensus ….. was that Rwanda was a madhouse, a primitive torture chamber where 
rival tribes were busy settling ancient scores.  I could not, watching the apocalyptic images 
unfolding on the video screens, imagine Rwanda as country in its own right107 
 
Keane goes on to talk about the fact that many in the community of reporters in Africa, as 
well as in the larger international community, knew this was Genocide but could not think of this 
conflict as anything other than ancient tribal rivalries gone awry.  This he claims is in part 
because of the journalistic habit of only covering Rwanda and Burundi during ethnic strife, doing 
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so quickly, and then leaving to chase another story.108  A final point of note that Keane makes 
about the coverage of the Rwandan Genocide is the constant depiction of both the Rwandan 
Civil War and the Genocide as the result of ethnic tensions, that these events “were a straight 
forward ‘tribal war.’”109   
 It is interesting that this type of terminology is used, instead of ethnic clash, terms such as 
“tribal war,” “tribal rivalry,” or any phrase in which the term “tribal” can be used.  Keane points 
out the lack of concern for social and/or political reasons in a lot of the early coverage of this 
Genocide.110  As a scholar it is difficult not to wonder how much this idea of tribal problems, and 
in the cases of some reports, ancient tribal problems allowed for the sitting on hands of the UN, 
the US government, and the nations of Western Europe.  By portraying Africans as tribal, was 
this reporting doing anything save abetting inertia? 
 Other Western journalists showed similar attitudes towards Rwanda that Keane displayed 
early on.  Christian Jennings’ work on Rwanda does not begin until after the Genocide was over 
and the RPF had already won and taken over the country.111   
For a more nuanced, if somewhat hyperbolic and poetic, view on Rwanda from a 
European journalist there is Ryszard Kapuscinski’s chapter on Rwanda in his book The Shadow 
of the Sun.  While he delves into many topics in Rwandan history from prehistory until the 
refugee crisis his words still strike a similar paternalist Western tone.112  He also sums up 
Western reaction perfectly.  “Those in Europe, observing the endless columns on their television 
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screens, could not fathom what force propelled these emaciated wanderers.”113  Of course he was 
describing the largely Hutu refugees and spends almost as much time on their story as he does on 
the Genocide itself, helping prop up the dual victimhood narrative that the rest of the world had 
settled on.   
Other works such as those of Linda Melvern and Samantha Power provide much more 
nuanced and rigorous looks at the Genocide.  These books are more likely to leave aside the 
clichés about “tribalism” and savagery.   
Timeline of Coverage 
  There are remarkable similarities to be found when looking at the coverage in the four 
more mainstream publications Newsweek, The New Yorker, Time, and US News and World 
Report.  For example there are multiple times in each publication that Rwanda does not get 
covered at all during one of the most devastating Genocides since the Holocaust.  How could 
there be any kind of rush to force America or the UN to intervene if Genocide receives little to 
no coverage?  This is especially true when national stories with more of an appeal to the cult of 
celebrity come into the picture.  The Simpson and Cobain situations came forward and often 
reduced, if not eliminated, coverage of Rwanda.  While the Cobain suicide did not demand as 
much attention as did Simpson, Cobain’s death still overshadowed the deaths of thousands when 
it happened.  The Simpson case was even more detrimental to coverage of the ongoing civil war 
and Genocide in Rwanda.  It is not until after the capture of most of the country by the RPF and 
the creation of the French safe zone that Rwanda re-enters the spotlight. 
 This reappearance is marked by the increase in the refugee situation, which by that point 
had already succeeded in vamping coverage away from the Genocide itself.  And with this new 
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Rwandan crisis, one that was born at least partially as the result of Western inaction suddenly 
both mainstream magazines and the world start to pay attention.  Suddenly even the more 
disinterested publications are filled with concern for the poor starving Rwandans, all the while 
acknowledging that some of these refugees were responsible for the Genocide.  Rwanda 
suddenly becomes worthy of the cover again, if it was ever worthy of it at all, once the refugee 
crisis is in full swing.  This seems somewhat logical in that it is easier and safer to be safe in a 
UN or NGO run camp than in the midst of a civil war and a Genocide to go about finding human 
interest stories.   
April 
The Rwandan Genocide enters the picture in US News and World Report with the April 
18, 1994 edition.  Rwanda gets the same amount of coverage as Bosnia, about a third of a page, 
while a story on the South African elections gets two pages.  The Rwanda piece covers the so-
called “Somalia factor” and the fact that Western governments rushed in to get their people out 
while no one was calling for an international force to deal with the situation.  It also reiterates the 
wildly discarded theory that it was the RPF that shot down the plane carrying President 
Habyarimana. The Western, especially American, efforts to pull their citizens out of Rwanda has 
an interesting counterpoint in the Bosnia article which quotes President Clinton saying that the 
West must show “‘firm resolve’”114  It is rather likely that the White House did not yet know the 
full extent of what was happening nor what was coming but obviously they knew enough to feel 
that pulling out American citizens was a prudent idea.  Firm resolve was needed for a European 
problem but there was no resolve called for or desired in regards to Rwanda.   
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The subsequent issue shows how much more important the South African elections were 
as opposed to either Rwanda or Bosnia in the eyes of this publication.  South Africa gets nine 
pages, while Rwanda gets a little over one third of a page and Bosnia sees a paragraph in the 
political gossip column “Washington Whispers.”  The RPF is discussed as if it is inevitable that 
they will seek out and obtain the most bloody of retributions.  This article does, at least, do a 
little more castigating of the world powers for their lack of response.115   
 Newsweek’s attention to Rwanda starts with their April 18, 1994 edition.  At the same 
time coverage of the Cobain suicide also begins.  In this issue articles dealing with Cobain and 
the related topic of suicide/teen suicide total six pages as well as the cover while Rwanda only 
gets a page of coverage.  The Rwanda article again uses the buzzword of the topic for the print 
media, tribal.116  This topic has already been commented on and will be addressed again in this 
section.  Returning to the Cobain dilemma, it is telling of the editorial staff at Newsweek that the 
death of one rock star, by his own hand no less, is given more attention than the plight of 
thousands in what amounts to a far off land that many Americans, even those with tertiary 
education, would be hard pressed to find on a map.  This culture of celebrity mindset has already 
been shown to have drastic consequences on the coverage of the Rwandan Genocide once the 
Simpson story breaks and will be shown to have the same effect throughout this work.   
 This separation of topics and prioritizing has to happen in every magazine, but this helps 
reinforce the notions of the previously discussed study on the media and natural disasters.  Not 
only did a slower running disaster in Eastern Europe demand comparable attention to Rwanda 
but both the Cobain and Simpson cases, which did not fully synch up chronologically to the 
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Rwandan Genocide and Civil War, became focuses demanding comparable, if not higher, 
amounts of attention.  While on a certain level the simplistic interpretation of the Einsensee and 
Stromberg study is “the closer to the home the more important”, a larger take away would be the 
closer to familiar, the more important.117  Priority is given to something that is somehow more 
understandable, while those things that are less understandable are less important.  This lessened 
importance in some ways anticipates and gives motivation to the “othering” and Orientalizing of 
Rwandans.  If something is removed from importance and from understanding making it 
important and understandable by creating a narrative that promotes understanding.  That 
narrative is one that has existed for a long time, the narrative of the savage, uncivilized, and 
barbarous African tribesman.  This type of narrative could in many ways be seen as a default 
setting for Africa in the age of parachute journalism.118 
 The next issue contains two Rwanda stories and surprisingly one of them has a pro 
intervention direction.  The other article, two pages in length, uses the phrase “orgy of tribal 
slaughter,” revealing, yet again, the propensity of the media during this period to show Rwanda 
in a less civilized light, as if Genocides had not happened in the Western world.  The opinion 
piece has several noteworthy passages.  In one section the author asks, when mentioning 
situations such as religious strife in Ireland, “Incidentally, why aren’t Protestants and Catholics- 
or Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia- referred to as “‘tribes’”?  Weren’t the Celts once a tribe?”   
Then, a scant one paragraph later, uses the words “tribal violence.”  This man, Jonathan Alter, 
then goes on to criticize both Clinton and African-American leaders for their shortcomings 
during this crisis.  He also points out the paradox of morality between intervention in Bosnia and 
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118 Keim, Mistaking Africa, Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, and various other sources.   
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the lack thereof in Rwanda.119  This early call for action, as well as the astute nature of the 
critiques of certain American leaders, is something not seen in other mainstream publications 
covered for this study.  Some of these points, in more detailed fashion, have been laid out by 
academics in works written after the dust had cleared from the Genocide and the concurrent Civil 
War.  Overall this piece is one of the best examples of how the media might have been able to 
force more debate about taking action, if not forcing action itself, as it seems obvious that Alter 
wished something would be done.  On the other hand the usage of tribal is still problematic from 
a language point of view.  Pointing out how others from less settled parts of Europe are 
committing the same types of violence does little to portray Rwandans as modern and human, 
instead it creates a larger pool of “tribal savages” that defy reason.   
 The New Yorker stories detailing Rwanda are, as previously mentioned, good pieces that 
show some knowledge of the topic.  Of the four pieces on Rwanda during the period mentioned 
earlier only two are articles.  One of the other two is an opinion piece while the last is a portrayal 
of Rwanda by an artist.  It should also be pointed out that the one Bosnia piece contains little in 
the way of an article and is mostly artistic interpretations of the ongoing strife by children.120 
While these children are from Bosnia it is telling that this story only appears once in eighteen 
issues.  Combining this with the one story on Haiti, it does tend to show a pattern.   
 Another facet of this coverage is that when Rwanda is addressed for the first time so is 
the Kurt Cobain suicide.  In this issue Cobain receives one more page of coverage than Rwanda 
does.   This story about Rwanda is about a human rights worker of Rwandan extraction and the 
trials and tribulations of her escape from the country during the days immediately after the 
                                                 
119 Newsweek, “Deeper in the Abyss” pages 32-3 and “When the World Shrugs” page 34, April 25, 1994.   
120 The New Yorker, April 4, 1994, page 87-9. 
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initiation of the Genocide.121  This story is rather specialized, dealing with a person that worked 
for Human Rights Watch, thusly a person of interest to Westerners.  It is also of the human 
interest story vein that so many stories during this period turned out to be.   
May 
A Time magazine article shows how in one report a magazine can get it both right and 
wrong simultaneously.  While dedicating part of the space in the cover story on Rwanda to 
gaining information from noted historians, earlier portions of the article still use phrases like 
“long litany of tribal massacres.”122  That phrase sets a false stage for the academic perspective 
that is presented in the article.  The phrase is used to compare the Rwandan Genocide to other 
conflicts in developing nations.  Although this article goes into more depth and discusses some 
of the political reasons behind the slaughters the use of the word tribal can preclude a full 
understanding of the underlying social, political, and economic causes of the Rwandan 
Genocide.  How much credence would be given to a report discussing problems between Greeks 
and Turks living on the same land if the words “tribal differences” were used?  While this report 
has some holes in it, it does highlight some of the problems occurring on the ground at that time.  
There is another view of the Rwandan Genocide that bears mentioning in this same issue.  In a 
letter to Time, a reader decries their use of a “ghastly photograph.”  His recommendation was 
that information could be “communicated through writing, without employing photographs unfit 
for publication.”123  It is possible that this reader had a point in his letter, in that the many images 
of carnage coming out of Rwanda were insufficient to move the UN or the West into actions, so 
                                                 
121 The New Yorker, pages 42-5, April 25, 1994.   
122 Time “The Killing Fields of Rwanda” page 57 for the quotation, pages 56-63 for the complete article, May 16, 
1994. 
123 Time “Letters” page 6, May 16, 1994. 
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what point did these photographs serve at the time, other than to act as some kind of, for lack of a 
better term, violence pornography?  Did showing the carnage in graphic detail contribute the 
overload on humanitarian crises that America seems to have been unable to handle?  After a 
story in which “tribalism” was used again these pictures might not have been news in the eyes of 
some readers.  Instead they might have reinforced the hopelessness that this level of carnage and 
the notion that the conflict that created the Genocide was so long running, ingrained, and never 
ending that even an intervention would do little save forestall the inevitable.   
 The May editions of US News and World Report shows new ways to cover Rwanda.  The 
first installment chooses to go with a favored tactic of journalists, the human interest story.  In 
this one page story, the plight of a young man that was sent by his parents to America to go to 
high school is chronicled.  It goes through his reaction to the outbreak of ethno-political 
massacres through the slaughter of his family.  This article also uses the already critiqued word 
“tribal” to describe the slaughter and the political differences but this word is also used in 
another piece from this edition detailing the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.124  This 
shows that the word tribal has demeaning contextual tones, and that Bosnia was also deemed 
worthy of those tones.  Of course the context of tribe in Europe versus tribe in Africa is vastly 
different, even if the targets of “othering” in Bosnia fall under other groups traditionally 
misunderstood in the United States, to greater or lesser degrees, of course: Muslims, Catholics, 
and Eastern Orthodox Christians.  If the latter then it would likely have something to do with two 
of the three factions in that conflict being Muslim and Eastern Orthodox.   
                                                 
124 US News and World Report, “Dateline” Outlook section for Rwanda and “Standing up to the Serbs” page 11 for 
Bosnia, May 2, 1994.   
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The May 2nd edition gives much more attention to Bosnia: one letter, a two page story 
and a two plus page story, than Rwanda, which receives two thirds of a page in comparison.  
South Africa gets a two plus page story and Haiti gets one half of a page in addition to sharing 
space in an editorial with Bosnia and China.125   
The following issue gives no attention at all to Rwanda while South African 
developments gain the cover, a two page article, and an eight page one. Bosnia, on the other 
hand, gets a page story and a paragraph story.126  It is telling that Rwanda could be found not fit 
for mention for approximately a month after the plane explosion that destroyed a nation.   
 Rwanda returns to the attention of US News with a brief two page story discussing the 
already growing refugee situation after about a month of hostilities.  The word “tribal” comes up 
again and this piece seems to be striving to let the West off the hook.  This article asserts that 
there is little chance to pierce the level of “tribal and ethnic” animosities but that instead the 
world should go about feeding and giving medical care to the survivors, with no policy of 
differentiating victims from killers mentioned, while employing diplomatic methods to try to 
resolve the conflict.127  The article reinforces to the average American that Africans are not 
worthy of saving from horrible violence but they are worthy of receiving basic humanitarian aid.  
The illogical conflicts of the “other” are beyond Western understanding however, these articles 
do not promote what can be considered the most basic form of humanitarian aid, protection of 
life, especially protecting civilians from mass slaughter.   
                                                 
125 US News and World Report, US News and World Report, Rwanda already cited, Bosnia letters page, page 10-11, 
42-4, South Africa pages 40-2, Haiti/Bosnia editorial page 76.  
126 US News and World Report, pages 10-1, 28-35 for South Africa and pages 13 and 14 for Bosnia, May 9, 1994.   
127 US News and World Report, “Rwanda’s Trail of Tears” pages 10-1, May 16, 1994. 
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This issue seemed to be rather light on foreign policy and international crisis overall as 
Haiti is mentioned in a paragraph and has a three page story, South Africa gets two stories that 
combine to be about a full page, and Bosnia receives only brief, if rather scathing, mention in a 
two page story on foreign policy.128  This seems to be a rather miniscule amount of coverage of 
world events when so many eruptions were happening around the world.   
 The subsequent issue gives most of its attention to Haiti, while the readers seem to favor 
South Africa, leaving very little to both Bosnia and Rwanda.  South Africa receives a partial 
page story and three letters.  Haiti seven pages total for two stories.  Bosnia gets a partial page, 
Rwanda, a three page story.  The Rwanda story is actually quite good, going into repercussions 
involving Burundi amongst other issues.  The third of a page Bosnia article shows something that 
could help explain the pattern of US News giving excuses for Western, UN, and American 
inaction.  This article praises the world leaders, including America, for delivering a peace plan to 
the Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Croats, while going on to say that America will not put troops 
on the ground if the parties do not agree to the peace plan.129  The logic of this plan seems 
dubious on many levels, but is something seen in international brinksmanship again and again, 
equating a level of equality to victim and victimizer, while placing the intervening power(s) 
above the situation.  The following issue makes no mention of Rwanda or Haiti but does cover 
Bosnia and the Kurt Cobain situation in brief and devotes an editorial to South Africa.130   
Newsweek starts off May without coverage of the Genocide or related stories. This lack 
of attention to the Genocide is the first of seven such examples by Newsweek during the period 
                                                 
128 US News and World Report, Haiti Washington Whispers page and pages 36-8, South Africa pages 39 and 42, and 
Bosnia in “‘Don’t Bother Me with Foreign Policy’” on page 39. 
129 US News and World Report, South Africa letters page and page 20, Bosnia “A ‘Foundation for Peace’ in Bosnia” 
page 17, Haiti pages 14-5 and 26-30, and Rwanda pages 46-8, May 23, 1994.   
130 US News and World Report, May 30, 1994. 
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from April 18 to the end of August, 1994. Seven separate issues that do not address the Rwandan 
Genocide by a major publication is far too many.  The others will be attended later, in the order 
in which they occurred131  .   
 When Rwanda returns to the attention of this periodical the word tribal again rears its 
head, this time as “savage tribal warfare.”  This type of language becomes more common the 
deeper one delves into the coverage of the time.  The other point of interest in this piece is that 
the word Genocide is used, for what appears to be the first time by Newsweek in this story.132  
This story shows a pattern from this magazine, insight and interest in the Rwandan situation are 
combined with poorly chosen words.  When combined with no attention in the previous issue 
and the pros and cons of the other issues already covered the developing picture is one of erratic 
coverage. “Savage tribal warfare” does more than  the normalize the notion that Rwandans, 
indeed Africans are incapable of reasoned thought and are controlled by primitive drives and 
long held arcane hatreds.   
 The next issue shows more of the up and down nature of Newsweek’s coverage.  In the 
article about Rwanda there is a serious editing error, calling the Hutu the minority, and attention 
being paid to refugees and RPF atrocities while largely ignoring the Genocide that was 
occurring.133  While it is not the intention of this study to defend the actions of the RPF as a 
whole, or its members, focusing on what now seem to be relatively isolated incidents of RPF 
reprisals is to show one of the most narrow views of the conflict and the Genocide.  Additionally, 
by getting to the refugee story this early Newsweek is foreshadowing the path that most of the 
later coverage will take once the refugee crisis has reached its height.   
                                                 
131 Newsweek, May 2, 1994. 
132 Newsweek, “Mass Murder” pages 40-1, May 9, 1994.    
133 Newsweek, “Escape from Hell” pages 34-5, May 16, 1994.  
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 The subsequent issue has a somewhat insightful story detailing the history of churches in 
the Hutu-Tutsi conflict over the decades and shows that the safe harbor offered by said churches 
in years past was a thing of the past.  The other main thrust of this story is the emptying of 
villages ahead of the RPF’s advance.134  The detail and accuracy with which the execution of 
massacres at churches shows a more in depth side of the Newsweek coverage.  But this is soon to 
be lessened by three problems.  The first is a three week, three issue banishment of coverage of 
the Rwandan Genocide. The next is a largely fatalist article when Rwanda returns to the pages of 
this publication.135   
June 
  The letters continue to roll into Time magazine for their June 6, 1994 edition after 
a veritable flurry of coverage in the intervening two issues, those being a paragraph on the 
Rwandan Genocide in each of the May 23 and 30 issues.136   This time the letters are a little 
more thoughtful.  These letters include one from a Rwandan in America saying that blame for 
the Genocide cannot be placed at the feet of either the German or Belgian colonial masters.  
Additional letters about Rwanda in this issue include various points of view.137  There are 
demands for action by the international community, feelings of guilt about the ability of 
Americans to filter out the inhumanity of the crisis in Rwanda, and a reminder that ethnic 
violence claimed thousands in Burundi the previous year to little fanfare then or even as a 
comparison to the Rwandan Genocide.  One letter from this bunch is of particular interest.  This 
                                                 
134 Newsweek, “The Killing Fields” pages 46-7, May 23, 1994. 
135 Newsweek, May 30, June 6, & June 13, 1994 for the gap and “Inside a War Zone: ‘The Situation is Desperate” 
pages 44-6, June 20, 1994. 
136 Time, dates provided.   
137 There were five letters that seem to have been printed in full plus a quotation from another letter. 
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letter is a rebuke of the previously mentioned one from May 16, 1994.  To sum up the letter its 
author wishes that more people took as much offence at the pictures of violence in Rwanda to 
act, instead of just complaining about being forced to see them.138  It could be argued that these 
letters in some way diminish the argument of this thesis.  Some people were engaging the subject 
matter, looking past the “othering” and “exoticizing” of Rwanda to try to understand the 
situation on the ground.  On the other hand the notions contained in these letters show that some 
can read beyond the simplistic and stereotypical ways in which the media was covering the 
Genocide and Civil War.  This nuanced reading of the subject matter by a mass audience shows, 
or at least implies, that a more complete and accurate reporting and commentary could have 
made humanitarian aid and mass appeal for such aid, a possibility.  It should be noted that there 
was action taken about the Refugee Crisis which became the main topic of media scrutiny as the 
Genocide was winding down.   
 Additionally this issue has a one paragraph description of the Hutu flight from Kigali as 
the RPF advances and a quotation from Boutros Boutros-Ghali about the failure of the 
international community.  There is also a one-page piece about the international community and 
its response to the Rwandan Genocide and the Rwandan Civil War.  This article covers many of 
the myriad reasons for the lack of international intervention but does not seem to be pressing for 
any real action.  It does less to call the world community to task, instead focusing on why it will 
not move to stop a Genocide and giving the, somewhat correct in retrospect, opinion that the 
only way the world would get involved en masse would be if the RPF won control of the country 
and did not start mass reprisals.139  It is this type of reporting of the print media and reaction 
                                                 
138 Time “Letters” page 6, June 6, 1994.   
139 Time, “Rebels Gain in Rwanda” page 14 for paragraph and “Sorry, Wrong Country” page 34 for the article.   
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from the public that lies at the center of this work.  Letters trying to provide a more thorough 
context and/or hoping for intervention are found in the same issue as a one paragraph piece that 
splits time between Boutros-Ghali’s half-hearted admonishments to the world and the mass 
exodus from Kigali and a one page article reciting chapter and verse the excuses of the world at 
large and the West in particular.  This type of coverage seems cursory and ill thought out 
especially considering the flood of coverage given to the post-Rwandan Genocide, post-
Rwandan Civil War refugee problem in Zaire and Burundi.   
 Another point that comes up again and again in the coverage of the Genocide and Civil 
War is a need to mention, seemingly at least once an article in Time, that the RPF is largely 
Tutsi.140  A perfect example of this is an article “All the Hatred in the World.”141  This need to 
nuance the coverage is interesting as in many cases later reporting, after the victory of the RPF, 
seems to cast a skeptical glance at moderate Hutus in positions of power after the RPF became 
the official government of Rwanda.   
 On June 20, 1994 this magazine can again only offer Rwanda a paragraph in their news 
in brief section, called “Chronicle.”  What is even more amazing is that this paragraph reports on 
a RPF massacre, which compared to the sheer volume of those committed by government forces 
were exceedingly rare.  The other frightening thing about this issue is that within it is another 
article about American foreign policy that fails to even address Rwanda, as if the situation there 
has nothing to do with foreign policy.142  It appears at this point as if after missing out on the 
chance to villianize and demonize the genocidaires properly in earlier stories the man that saved 
Rwanda and his army are in some ways the new target.   
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141 Time, pages 36-7, June 13, 1994. 
142 Time, “Rwandan End Game?” page 20 and Hurry Up and Wait” pages 40-1.   
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 This pattern continues in the next issue, in which the letters section devotes more time to 
Rwanda than the rest of the magazine does.  There are only four letters dealing with Rwanda and 
one of them is in a section of letters dealing with the fiftieth anniversary of D-Day.  The one 
paragraph article details the RPF capture of the interim capital set up by the government after the 
fall of Kigali.143  However, this lack of coverage can easily be explained by the main story, O. J. 
Simpson.  In this same issue the O. J. situation dominates the coverage: the cover; a paragraph on 
page 19; an eight page story and an essay.144  Bosnia also gains more attention this issue with a 
one paragraph story and a four page story.145  The exotic African nation of Rwanda is calming 
down and America now has its own tragedy to deal with, the death of two white people in an 
upper class neighborhood, in a major metropolitan area and the prime suspect is not only black 
but a former professional football player and occasional actor.   
 US News and World Report coverage in June starts with three weeks not mentioning 
Rwanda.   In the first Bosnia gets three letters, a mention in a story about European revolutions 
of the past, while Haiti gets one paragraph.  These two stories are mentioned in relation to 
Clinton and human rights.  South Africa also receives a two paragraph story.146  The third 
consecutive issue not mentioning Rwanda contains only brief mentions of Haiti with none of the 
other stories being addressed.147  In the last of this series of lack of Rwanda coverage Haiti gets 
two mentions, as does Bosnia, while South Africa gets mentioned in the “Business” Section.148  
How does Genocide of this magnitude, with so many dying, so quickly fail to be noteworthy, or 
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indeed newsworthy, for four straight weeks?  This is somewhat unfathomable.  The lack of 
coverage of Genocide is rarely seen.  In the cases that were unreported, or underreported149, in 
the twentieth century, the countries were completely locked down.  This is not the case in 
Rwanda as there were areas where reporters could maneuver, a somewhat dangerous situation to 
be sure, but still manageable.  What makes this even more alarming is that other magazines were 
running Rwanda articles at the same time.   
 The next issue closes out the month started in the analysis above and returns to the overly 
covered O. J. Simpson case.  Simpson gets five pages of coverage, Haiti just over a page, while 
Rwanda’s return to US News and World Report coverage is under a page long.150   
 In Newsweek a chilling tale of the human interest variety is seen about a man trying to 
find his two surviving daughters after losing his pregnant wife and dozens of other relatives to 
the Genocide.151  This issue also marks the start of a sequence of three consecutive covers 
dedicated to the O.J. Simpson trial.152  While the issues of domestic violence and the criminal 
justice system’s treatment of minorities and the rich are all fascinating and thoroughly valid 
topics, by the time this stretch of three O.J. covers has concluded the Rwandan Genocide is 
almost three months old and Rwanda has still not deserved a cover if one were to go by what the 
publication in question did. 
After an eight week gap in coverage by The New Yorker, there is a return of the human 
interest story style of reporting, though this one is longer than the previous efforts.  This is the 
telling of a man trying to get his Tutsi relatives out of Burundi before the violence in Rwanda 
                                                 
149 Such as the liquidation of the Kulaks in Soviet controlled Ukraine. 
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27, 1994.   
151 Newsweek, “I Lost Nearly Everyone” page 41, June 27, 1994 
152 Newsweek, June 27, July 4 and July 11, 1994 issues.   
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spills over the border enough to endanger their lives.153  While interesting, and in some ways 
informative this story, as well as the previously mentioned one, are not going to provide readers 
with a great deal of knowledge of the situation.  This story does give occasional glimpses into the 
past of both Rwanda and Burundi and shows how these problems affected these would-be 
émigrés.  Both of these stories are well put together for what they are, human interest type 
stories.   
July 
 Time’s focus on the Simpson case occurs again as the coverage enters July, where 
Rwanda gets one paragraph about French troops entering the country while the O. J. case gets 
addressed in the “To Our Readers” page, a story of similar length to the Rwanda story, and two 
other stories taking up a total of ten pages.154 Again Simpson coverage pushes the ongoing 
disaster of Rwanda aside in the subsequent issue, although not to the extent of the previous two 
issues.  O. J. gets a one paragraph piece within “Chronicles” as does Rwanda, detailing the flight 
of large numbers of Hutu into other nations once it became clear that the RPF was going to take 
over the whole country, but Simpson also gets a three page long story.155  The Simpson factor 
increases seemingly exponentially in the following installment of Time as that story receives 
twenty letters, a one paragraph story, a pair of other stories totaling four pages, and a cartoon, 
while Rwanda receives one paragraph on a UN plan for a ceasefire and on the number of 
refugees in the French occupied zone.156  The Rwandan story has largely become old news at 
this point and it has yet to fully morph into a much more palatable and photogenic refugee crisis 
                                                 
153 The New Yorker, “Flight from Death” pages 44-7 & 50-5, June 20, 1994.  
154 Time July 4, 1994. 
155 Time, page 14 for Rwanda page 11 and pages 26-8 for Simpson, July 11, 1994.    
156 Time, letters page, page 9, pages 34-7, and page 12 for Simpson, page 14 for Rwanda, July 18, 1994 
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that will force the hand of the international community.   And again Bosnia also receives 
slightly more attention in Time’s next issue, with a paragraph story and one letter.157  The O. J. 
Simpson murder case becomes rather important to the media from its introduction on and from 
this point forward the deaths of two people in California garners much more attention than the 
death of 800,000 in Central Africa.158  Anyone that watched television during the time of the 
Simpson case should remember how impossible it was to not get deluged by media coverage.  
Even if one did not try to keep up with the goings on of the trial friends, family members, and 
coworkers were likely to keep one apprised as a matter of course.  The edition of Time just 
covered also shows the change of direction, and magnitude, of the Rwanda coverage.  Once the 
refugee crisis breaks and the RPF ties up most of the country, allowing for easier media access, 
the media shifts to showing pictures and talking about the plight of those that fled Rwanda.  Now 
an exotic and failing Africa could be shown without all the danger of facing down perpetrators of 
Genocide and without the possibility of going against the official wording of the Clinton 
Administration on the Genocide.  Now it could avoid reminding world leaders of their legal 
responsibility to act to stop Genocide, instead reminding them of a simple moral responsibility to 
help refugees.  The moralizing level in stories like this shows through clearly.  And the end result 
is that refugees are portrayed as more important than Genocide victims, even if a large number of 
the refugees committed said Genocide.  Whether this was an effort to cover the catastrophe in a 
more palatable way, an effort to sell more magazines, or an effort to prop up the aid industry is 
unclear.  What is clear is that, at least from an editorial perspective, a refugee is greater than a 
victim of crimes against humanity.   
                                                 
157 Time, letters page and page 12, July 25, 1994. 
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Once the refugee problem becomes apparent the media starts paying a great deal of 
attention to Rwanda again.  It is hard to determine if this is because it is easier to cover this story 
because the Civil War has largely ended and the escapees are in a more accessible place or if 
Rwanda, after the initial outbreak of Genocide and the resurgence of the civil war, became 
yesterday’s news but the advent of the second humanitarian crisis of Rwanda brings new fervor 
to Time.  In fact while the Simpson case generates a large number of letters, fourteen to be exact, 
it only gets only one paragraph of attention by the magazine, Rwanda gets a paragraph plus a 
three-page story once the refugee crisis comes into focus.159  This is a continuation of the themes 
discussed in both Said and Keim.  Rwanda goes from a genocidal nightmare to a more 
manageable humanitarian crisis, at least to the common thought of the time.  Once this happens, 
the media has a story that it can sink its teeth into and the international community has a crisis 
that it can in some way do something about without putting troops at risk.  The international 
community could be forced into action to help refugees no matter how many genocidaires were 
hiding among them.  The popular nature of these magazines not withstanding a higher level of 
clarity and differentiation might have helped to reveal the situation to average Americans sooner.   
In US News and World Report the pattern shown prior continues similarly throughout the 
rest of the period of this work.  In the following two issues Rwanda gets two pages to Simpson’s 
seven, while Haiti receives just a paragraph and then Rwanda receives nothing while O. J. gets 
four letters and six pages of stories and Haiti gets a letter and two pages of coverage.160  The 
good thing about the above mentioned Rwanda story is that it compliments France for their 
planned intervention while pointing out their ties to the former Habyarimana regime and 
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questioning their motives.161  The rest of the month of July shows Rwanda getting little mention 
while O. J. gets the lion’s share of attention.162 The attention paid to Rwanda is not only lacking 
in volume in this publication during this period, it is also a decidedly mixed bag.  The July 18 
article makes the French intervention seem less self serving, as if praising French intervention, 
while the article from the July 25 can hardly be called that, it merely sets up the later, more 
heavily covered in many outlets, refugee topic by showing a picture of those fleeing and a 
paragraph that is mostly statistics of the number of the people fleeing.163 
 In the second issue of a string of Newsweek issues bearing a Simpson case related cover 
again does an interesting job of covering Rwanda, this time providing an editorialized piece 
about French intervention, showing great insight into the situation both on the ground and in the 
back rooms of the halls of power in both France and Rwanda.164  This is one of the better 
covered topics by the mainstream media; it appears that some of these magazines did their 
homework.  It is somewhat amazing that so much knowledge could be possessed about the 
political situation in Rwanda while at the same time the country is being depicted with the word 
tribal over and over again.  The next two issues are another gap in Rwanda coverage, the first of 
which sees Simpson receiving the third consecutive cover and then the subsequent edition gives 
the Simpson case a sizable amount of coverage.165 
 Rwanda returns at the end of the currently discussed month with three separate mentions.  
The first is one sentence in the “Conventional Wisdom” section.  The second is yet another in the 
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ongoing swell of refugee stories at the time, while the third is reminiscent of a letter discussed 
earlier when detailing Time’s coverage of the Rwandan Genocide.166  While this letter is less 
critical than the one mentioned in Time, it wonders why “obscenities” and/or “photos of a 
healthy, naked human body” would not be published but large, detailed shots of a casualty can be 
shown.  The author of this letter thinks that Newsweek should be allowed to print what they wish 
but felt that a smaller picture might have been warranted.  This letter is in many ways indicative 
of the type of coverage that was to come as the Simpson case became a primary journalistic 
concern.   The issues of celebrity, race, economic power, and gender in the Simpson case can be 
seen by many as important but Rwanda encompassed all of those issues and many more while at 
the same time looking at global power dynamics.  But the Simpson case, while gruesome, was 
not the charnel house that Rwanda was.   
 The New Yorker has an opinion piece on Operation Turquoise, and it is among the better 
pieces discussed for this chapter as it covers, in pithy but enlightening fashion the ties between 
France and the Rwandan regime at the time.  While this commentary is largely culled from other 
journalistic sources, both domestic and European, it does a rather detailed job of showing the 
reasons why the French might be prone to intervening to protect a Francophone country from a 
group of English speaking rebels.  This opinion piece is very straightforward and does a good job 
of bringing up questions relating to the issues at hand.167 
  
 
 
                                                 
166 Newsweek, “Conventional Wisdom” section, “’Its Too Big’” pages 30-1, & “Letters” page 12, July 25, 1994. 
167 The New Yorker, “Gallic Mischief” pages 4-5 July 18, 1994.   
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August 
 The August 1 issue of Time contains many interesting items.  Rwanda gets the cover 
again for the second time during this period.  Rwanda also gets a paragraph length story, a ten 
page story and a one page essay comparing Rwanda and a recent astronomical explosion.168  The 
essay comparing the Rwandan Genocide to a natural phenomenon is very similar to the language 
to what Said and Keim discuss in their books.  African disasters and explosions in space, both 
are savage, unknowable, exotic, foreign, and completely beyond control.   
There are two key points in the long article of this edition.  The first is that the figures 
given for deaths do not come close to what is supposed by historians, 800,000.169  The casualty 
total for the Rwandan Genocide used in this article is at least 500,000.  While this at least covers 
some complaints, it is telling that media estimates fall at least 300,000 deaths short of historical 
consensus.   
 The second deals not so much with the magazine as with President Clinton, his foreign 
policy decisions, and his reasons for them.  Clinton was moved to involve the US military in 
humanitarian efforts for the refugees in the camps due to a death rate of one person per 
minute.170  This would create an average total of 1,440 deaths per day in the camp.  This sum, 
while abhorrent, does not come close to the approximately 8,000 deaths per day during the 
Genocide if the commonly held figures are to be believed.  It would take about 555 days for the 
refugee crisis to kill as many Rwandans as the genocide did going with the 800,000 deaths figure 
or roughly 347 days if the figure from the article being discussed was to be taken as the proper 
                                                 
168 Time, cover, page 13, pages 28-37, and page 64.   
169 Power, A Problem from Hell, 91, among others. 
170 Time, “Cry the Forsaken Country” page 33 for the Genocide death toll, the number of deaths in the camp and 
President Clinton’s response.    
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source.  Yet with this information Clinton decided not to act in the face of the Genocide but 
found it prudent to do so very close to the beginning of the refugee situation.  This is a similar 
thought process to many thoughts on Africa and the developing world.  Africans could not be 
stopped from engaging in violence over the slights of the past but the US did not have to change 
thoughts and minds to provide food, tents, and clean water to the primitive Africans.   
 The rest of the month of August 1994 provides similar results.  In the following 
installment there are two Rwanda stories, a one paragraph piece on US humanitarian aid to 
Kigali and another that was discussed above.171  Simpson is addressed in the “To our Readers” 
section, a one paragraph story, in a cartoon, and in a two page story, while Bosnia gets a 
paragraph and Haiti two letters.172  This amount and type of coverage is actually very good and 
shows a certain amount of balance.  The next issues shows Rwanda starting to slip into the 
background with the same amount of stories but less overall pages, with stories of one paragraph 
and one page.  These stories are about the return of a small number of refugees, the tactics used 
by some in the former government military and paramilitary organizations to keep them in the 
camps, and the thirst of these same people for vengeance.173  In this issue both Bosnia and Haiti 
receive approximately the same amount of attention.174  This shows that Rwanda is starting to 
regain competition even during the morbidly photogenic refugee period.   
 The subsequent issue shows that some readers do care more about Rwanda than they do 
about O. J.  The letters breakdown is six to three in favor of Rwanda.  There is also a quotation 
from another letter on Rwanda that does not appear to be published in full.  The quotation in 
                                                 
171 Time, “US Troops in Rwanda” page 19 and “Destination Unknown” pages 38-41, August 8, 1994. 
172 Time, pages 16, 18, 46-7 for Simpson, page 19 for Bosnia, and the letters page for Haiti.   
173 Time, “Devil’s Dilemma in Rwanda” page 12 and  “The Swagger of Defeat” page 25, August 15, 1994. 
174 Time, pages 10 and 24 for Bosnia and pages 11 and 22-3 for Haiti.   
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question speaks of the apathy that is killing Rwandans, one wonders where this concern for 
apathy was during the Genocide?175  Despite the ongoing issues, and communications from 
readers seemingly wanting more coverage given the amount of letters on the topic, Rwanda 
receives a one paragraph story that splits time between a riot in Goma, Zaire and RPF approval 
of and desire to cooperate with an international war crime tribunal.176  The Simpson case, in 
addition to the letters, receives a brief mention of foot surgery and a one page story, while 
Bosnia gets only a paragraph.177  This continues the pattern of a Genocide being outflanked for 
media attention by a refugee crisis caused and, in some cases, partaken of by the very people that 
committed the Genocide and that even this refugee crisis has to compete with other issues of the 
day.  While the Genocide was obviously over by this point, much reporting could have been 
done on mass graves, but this topic must not have had the same importance.  Or perhaps the 
African situation cannot could not be properly criticized and exoticized if Western failures were 
also brought up. 
 The last issue of Time to be covered in this thesis is the August 29, 1994 issue.  In this 
issue Rwanda again has to compete with OJ Simpson for attention, a one paragraph story each, 
Rwanda getting two stories that share two pages while Simpson gets a one page article.  South 
Africa and Bosnia both get a paragraph each.  Rwanda’s one paragraph story and the top story of 
the split page story both deal with the repercussions of the French withdrawal from Rwanda and 
the fears that this might lead to another mass exodus by Hutu, especially those in the formerly 
French controlled zone.  The other story might not even be considered a Rwandan story, as it is 
more about what the situation in Rwanda might cause, and had already caused to that point, in 
                                                 
175 Time, page 9 for all letters, August 22, 1994. 
176 Time, “Zairean Soldiers Stoned” page 22  and “Hope Battles Fear” page 53. 
177 Time, “Milestones” page and page 60 for Simpson and page 18 for Bosnia.   
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Burundi.  The top article of the split page once again uses the erroneous 500,000 figure for the 
Genocide death toll.178  These articles definitely look at valid topics, but it seems as if there is 
little that those at Time want to discuss about the Genocide.  It is mentioned in passing 
throughout the articles after the victory of the RPF and the first huge surges of refugee situation, 
but in many ways this attention seems to be a mere afterthought, seemingly the Genocide is over 
now it should only be mentioned in passing, often with faulty numbers, and often as a reason 
why the refugees are afraid, or should be, and why the RPF might start enacting reprisals.   
 This magazine was not full of cries for help and/or action by the international 
community, the UN, or the US coming from the journalists or editors.  The most compelling 
cases made for intervention, and sometimes even concern, were given by letters from their 
readers.  Does this not show a somewhat disinterested stance by the magazine?  Looking back 
through the Time articles read for this work the author cannot recall seeing anyone call the White 
House to task for their tacit avoidance of the word Genocide, which academics such as Prunier 
have discussed at length.  Overall what this magazine covered and how it covered it was not the 
worst case looked at but it is in the same consistently mediocre vein that many other publications 
supplied.   
 One such example of this is the article “Destination Unknown.”  This piece says that Paul 
Kagame is the “Vice President and Defense Minister...the Tutsi general who holds the real power 
in the country.”179  While there is obviously  some veracity to these ideas the fact that two of the 
three power positions, Prime Minister and President, were held by Hutus does show some desire 
to form an equitable Rwandan government by the RPF.  Additionally even if Kagame was not 
                                                 
178 Time, pages 19 and 45 for Simpson , “French Hand off in Rwanda” page 20 and 56-7 for Rwanda and page 20 for 
both Bosnia and South Africa.   
179 Time, pages 38-41, August 8, 1994. 
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playing puppet-master he would certainly be needed to control troops that followed him as well 
as those Tutsi survivors of the Genocide that would in all likelihood view him as a savior.  This 
idea receives short shrift in Time.  Kagame’s later stranglehold on power in Rwanda does, of 
course, somewhat validate these notions.  This nuanced view is also reinforcing the “othering” of 
Rwandans to a certain level by providing more agency to Kagame, who received western 
training, than other Rwandans.  This much spot on analysis being included in a story about the 
incoming order when in many ways the early reporting was rife with “othering,” denigrating, and 
infantilizing Rwandans.  This new analysis is just another way to “other.”  The man who stopped 
the Genocide was going to have power as an almost messianic figure and as the leader of the new 
military force of the new government.   
 August 1994 shows the same kind of coverage of the refugee crisis to US News that Time 
displayed.  The first issue of the month Rwanda outpaces all of the other stories being looked at 
in this work.  O. J., Bosnia and Haiti get a combined two pages while the Rwandan refugee crisis 
gets five pages.180  This switch to large scale coverage, especially after the earlier discussed 
period of little to no coverage starts to reinforce the idea that the refugee situation is in some way 
more important than a Genocide.  The Rwanda piece is rather well done and discusses many of 
the possible ramifications to the rest of central Africa as well as looking at its main focus, the 
refugee problem, although the article does imply that the refugee problem is worse than the 
Genocide that precipitated it.181  
 Attention to the crisis stays fairly steady for the rest of the month in this publication while 
the other stories are relegated to second tier status.  In the next issue, Rwanda gets a paragraph 
                                                 
180 US News and World Report, Bosnia and Haiti page 8, Simpson page 23, and Rwanda pages 42-6, August 1, 
1994.   
181 US News and World Report, pages 42-6, August 1, 1994. 
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story plus a two and one third page article.  Simpson is not covered in a story but is the focus of 
three letters, Haiti attracts the attention of two letters and also gets a one third of a page story and 
Bosnia gets two thirds of a page.182  The Rwanda stories are about fears of instability in central 
Africa and the need for Rwandan refugees to return home if the humanitarian crisis is to be 
solved.  These stories both seem to be accurate and well thought out.   
The stories of the following installment detailing Rwanda are not very important within 
the scope of this project, one story on US efforts to bring water filtration systems to the camps 
and another on the refugee situation.  What is interesting is that the second article gives a new 
estimate for the number of casualties for the Genocide, one million deaths.183  What is so 
remarkable about this new death toll is that mere weeks previous the magazine was reporting a 
figure half that and now this doubling, to what many would now call an inaccurate number, has 
no mention with it of why the figure has risen so fast.  It seems possible, indeed likely, that the 
new narrative of the Refugee Crisis precipitated this change.  As this narrative comes to 
dominate the discourse and as relief for refugees became something that the media, Western 
governments, and the UN could get behind, reported death tolls rising and the need for 
intervention became paramount.  This type of intervention involves something that the West has 
long been good at, the feel good tragedy.  By setting up a permanent refugee crisis international 
aid organizations are able to ensure jobs for their organizations and in their fields, while those 
that, consciously or unconsciously, portray Africans, indeed any from the Third World, as 
subhuman, less cultured, savage, et al have an easy story.  The Rwandan Refugee Crisis left 
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Rwanda an empty nation, it turned refugee camps into armed insurgency bases where the rule of 
the gun was king, and it allowed for international intervention without the fear of getting into a 
shooting war.  By setting up international aid predominantly outside of Rwanda most conflicts, 
major and minor, for the next several months were confined to the areas just inside the borders of 
Rwanda, making the biggest threat to aid workers also the biggest threat to the new, RPF led 
government in Rwanda, the refugees, and to regional stability.  Rwanda’s borders became a slow 
burning conflict that would draw in various governmental and rebel powers from around 
Africa.184  The issue following this one brings with it no mention of Rwanda and only passing 
interest in other stories such as O. J. and Haiti.185 
 The last issue of US News to be addressed is both within and outside the bounds of this 
study as a result of it being a multi date issue.  The August 29/September 5 issue has only a 
partial page story on the goings on in Rwanda, discussing the new batch of refugees leaving the 
French safe zone as the French mandate for peacekeeping expired.186  This rather brief story is a 
fitting end to the coverage of this magazine addressed in this work as it shows both the 
preoccupation with the refugee crisis over the Genocide and/or efforts to rebuild Rwanda and it 
is an incredibly short piece that recalls many earlier issues and their limited coverage.  That is 
probably the most apt analysis that can be given of the US News and World Report coverage of 
Rwanda, spotty coverage that did not seem to be very concerned with the situation in Rwanda, 
showing brief flashes of interest with periods of minimal or nonexistent attention.  
 Rwanda does not fly under the radar in the August 1 edition of Newsweek, getting the 
cover, a quotation, a cartoon, and three stories detailing Africa in general and Rwanda in 
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186 US News and World Report, Page 14, August 29/September 5 1994. 
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particular. The largest story details the situation in the refugee camps, while two one page stories 
deal with Western/African interaction and the question of whether or not war crimes tribunals are 
a good idea for Rwanda, respectively.187  The refugee story is rather standard fare for this time, 
combining details of the situation in the camps with hopes that the victims can be saved and fears 
that they will not be.   
The article on Western/African interactions is rather detailed and shows good 
understanding of the situation on the ground in Africa.  There is a potential problem with both 
this article and the subsequent; both cite the Genocide death toll at 1 million victims.  As has 
been previously stated, this study prefers the 800,000 figure for the death toll.188  The final 
Rwanda related article discusses fears that war crimes trials will deter the return and 
reintegration of refugees.  The question dealt with in this article comes down to whether peace is 
more valuable than justice.  The author concludes, correctly the historical record shows, that “the 
weary West will choose peace.”189 
 In the remaining four issues of Newsweek for the month, and for this study show another 
decline in coverage as even the refugee camp situation cannot seem to hold attention for too 
long.  The August 8 issue has two stories dealing with Rwanda, one a diary of camp life and 
death, and the other about intervention by the West in Third World countries.190  The former 
shows the same human interest type of coverage that a previous story about the man looking for 
his surviving daughters showed while the latter talks about places such as Rwanda, Bosnia, and 
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Haiti that the West may decide to intervene in, as well as other less obvious choices for Western 
action.  This article is particularly critical of France and her motives for intervening.   
The next issue has only one quotation dealing with the situation in and around Rwanda 
after the RPF victory and during the height of the camp situation.  A Rwandan soldier, 
presumably of the former regime, in Zaire is asked what he wanted from the world at large.  His 
answer was “‘Bullets, so we can go back to our country.’”191  This answer in many ways shows 
how effective the indoctrination of Rwandan soldiers was and why the continued presence of 
peacekeepers was necessary, unfortunately by just using this quotation by itself and not 
combining with other such sentiments in a story there is less contextual explanation than might 
be needed.   The final two issues of the month show little new content dealing with Rwanda.  
The August 22 issue prints four reader letters and a commentary by the magazine on these and 
other letters while the next issue does not deal with Rwanda at all.192 
 Overall the coverage by Newsweek was erratic.  Some good stories, some more 
questionable ones combined with gaps in coverage and the constant use of the word tribal when 
referring to the violence.  The opinion of this study is that the reporting by this magazine was 
helped by a somewhat higher level of concern, or at the very least attention as witnessed by the 
rather early and strong call for intervention.  But as with the previous magazines in this chapter 
rushes to push aside not just Rwanda but Bosnia for the Simpson case and the Cobain suicide 
show a tendency towards sensationalism and away from both a desire to inform readers of the 
world beyond American borders and any humanitarian activist goals.   
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In the overall coverage of the New Yorker detailing the Rwandan Genocide is somewhat 
sparse, but as this publication is geared towards a New York City audience this is expected.  
Within this limited coverage are some very well thought out articles and opinion pieces that 
provide valid and insightful coverage of certain topics concerning this Genocide.  But as with 
other media sources to be covered previously or later in this study the New Yorker chose to give 
a large amount of their attention to the Simpson case while giving less attention to humanitarian 
crises such as Bosnia and Haiti.  There are four stories dealing with Rwanda between April 4 and 
August 8, 1994.  Bosnia receives only one story during this time, Cobain one story and two 
letters, South African elections two stories and one letter, Haiti one story, and O.J. Simpson five 
stories/commentary pieces.193  This relatively even level of stories detailing the Simpson case 
and the Rwandan Genocide belies the true level of coverage.  The five Simpson stories are 
printed over four consecutive issues, while the Rwanda stories are printed between April 25 and 
August 8.  O.J. as the main story is something seen over and over again from the print media in 
this period.  
Overall while their perspectives on Rwanda seem to be well informed, the New Yorker 
seemed to follow a slightly esoteric track when covering the Genocide.  There interest seems to 
be largely on people from the region with ties to the West, as opposed to the situation overall.  
This might have been a deliberate tactic, showing ties between Rwanda, Burundi, and the 
Western World, or it could have been because those involved in the two human interest stories 
had ties to people living in New York state.  Whatever the case may be these stories do provide 
some context for the greater happenings in Rwanda and Burundi.  The opinion piece is somewhat 
standard in that it questions French intervention in Rwanda.  This does at least show knowledge 
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of the area, its history, and the political situations that ensnared many facets of the Rwandan 
Genocide.  If there had been more coverage and/or a more concerted effort to focus on the big 
picture as opposed to tiny snippets then the New Yorker might have been much better off than the 
other sources in this chapter.  Considering the purpose of this magazine it is not surprising that 
they only went as far as they did, and limited good coverage is better than no coverage at all. 
Conclusions 
There are publications that do not fit neatly into a month by month breakdown.   Mother 
Jones and the Progressive, provide coverage scarcely, if at all, of Rwanda.  Mother Jones does 
not cover the Rwandan Genocide during a period of five issues that goes beyond the time frame 
normally addressed by this study.  The rather extended period of looking at the coverage of this 
magazine (four months/two issues) is due in large part to the lack of the familiar stories being 
covered at this time.  It seemed possible that this magazine was putting issues out well ahead of 
time and that coverage of Rwanda would eventually catch up.  This turned out to not be the case.  
It is not only Rwanda that does not receive much attention, but Bosnia and South Africa only get 
small stories.  During this period, however, there is a rather lengthy piece discussing India.  That 
combined with the two short pieces show that this publication did pay some attention to 
international events, yet Rwanda did not seem worthy of any coverage at all to the editors of this 
magazine.194  
Overall in the period from the May 2 issue to the August 22/29 issue of Mother Jones 
there are few other references to Rwanda, including two editorials and one opinion piece 
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discussing the possibility of a standing UN army that mentions Rwanda within the context of 
other human rights disasters of that era. 
The coverage in the New Republic provides much more coverage than the other liberal 
leaning publications covered Mother Jones, the Progressive, and the Nation combined.  This 
magazine gives a fairly steady amount of attention to the Rwandan Genocide but still does not 
provide a major push for intervention.  Additionally it takes on a somewhat specialized aspect to 
its coverage, though not to the extent of the earlier discussed New Yorker.  From the period 
beginning in April and ending in August this publication provides ten stories dealing with 
Rwanda to varying degrees.  The first piece in the New Republic about Rwanda does not appear 
until May.  In this piece a familiar name shows up, that of Joshua Hammer, who penned so many 
of the Newsweek reports on Rwanda.  This story discusses the beginnings of the Genocide and 
what the situation was like in Kigali before foreigners of Western extraction were evacuated.  
This story gives some short, and somewhat simplified, mentions of the history of both Rwanda 
and Burundi and talks about some the effects of the Civil War and Genocide that he witnessed in 
and on the way to Kigali.195  This story is good for what it is, a firsthand account of the 
beginnings of the Rwandan Genocide.  It does not delve into some of the depths of his stories in 
Newsweek but it seems rather obvious that this is an early story. 
 The issue following has two mentions of Rwanda, two paragraphs in a  piece on 
American foreign policy while the other is a one page story about why Bosnia was more 
important to international order than Rwanda was at the time.  The two paragraphs detail the UN 
withdrawal of many of its troops from Rwanda and compare Rwanda to Haiti and Bosnia.  This 
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story takes the stance that Haiti was at the time more important than Rwanda because it has long 
been part of “the American sphere of influence.”196 
 The coverage of the Rwandan Genocide by the Nation shows an amount of 
concern for the people of Rwanda, but only sporadically.  Considering that the killings started in 
early April it is somewhat surprising that there is no mention of Rwanda until the May 2 edition.  
The first article to appear in the Nation gives little information about the death of Tutsis instead 
focusing on a short, and somewhat inaccurate in this author’s opinion, history of the divisions 
between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda while also covering the Rwandan Civil War and the plane 
crash.  The main thrust of this article however is the international arms market in relation to the 
Rwandan government.197  The portion about international arms dealers is rather well done, much 
better than some works by historians and political scientists if all of the information is valid.  It 
should be noted however that this article does not really delve into the heart of the matter.  By 
turning away from the Genocide and democide committed by the Rwandan government and its 
proxies and instead focusing on the minutiae of the conflict this article does something of a 
disservice to the readers of this magazine, not to mention the victims in Rwanda.   
After this article Rwanda is not mentioned again until four weeks, and four issues, later.  
First briefly in a response to a letter from a reader, with the respondent saying that he was going 
to Rwanda and then there is a brief criticism of the Clinton administration for being more 
concerned about a young man about to be caned in Singapore than about the Genocide in 
Rwanda.198  It is telling that a story of mass murder can somehow go under the proverbial radar 
for three issues and then in a fourth only receive a couple of passing mentions. 
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Moving on to the coverage, or rather the lack thereof, of the Rwandan Genocide in the 
National Review, there is very little of merit to be mentioned.  That is not to say that there is not 
much to address with this publications coverage of one of the greatest humanitarian disasters of 
the twentieth century.  Starting with the April 4, 1994 issue and ending with the August 29 issue 
of that same year Rwanda is mentioned fewer times than some of their favorite adversaries.  
Returning to the coverage by the National Review on Rwanda the only major mention of the 
problems of Rwanda comes not during the Genocide/Civil War period but instead deals with the 
refugee problem, or to be more exact humanitarian efforts to fix what the Genocide and the Civil 
War wrought on the country and the region.  There is one shining light in this brief, one 
paragraph long story.  It calls upon Europe in general and France in particular, to take an active 
role in relief efforts.  It also calls to attention the fact that France armed the old regime and 
stepped into the fray “only when their clients were in full flight.”199  While this reporting is valid 
and follows the current historical record wonderfully, one paragraph dedicated to the slaughter of 
800,000 people would not seem to be a sufficient amount of coverage.200.  This type of disregard 
can in some ways be expected as this magazine is noted for its conservative bent, especially 
considering the pseudo-isolationist ideas of the Republican party at that time,201 but other human 
rights issues of the day were either largely ignored or used as fodder for assault on the 
mainstream media and/or the Clinton administration.   
 The, at the time, ongoing ethno-political conflict in Bosnia comes up a mere six times in 
serious fashion during the above mentioned issues, two of which are just brief mentions in other 
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stories.  The total with jokes and spoof pieces barely rises to double figures.  South Africa is 
addressed a total of nine times during this period, Haiti ten.  Thankfully there is little to no 
mention during this period of either Kurt Cobain or O. J. Simpson, which many other 
publications overemphasized.202   
Another interesting case of lack of coverage is the Forward, a weekly newspaper 
published for the Jewish-American community.  Between the beginning of April to the end of 
August 1994 Rwanda is mentioned a mere five times.  Three of those times are mere passing 
references, one by a playwright whose newest play was being discussed, another by a man going 
on vacation to Disney that wanted to leave his troubles, and those of the world, at the door, and a 
third mention of Rwanda, along with the O.J. Simpson case, taking focus away from a meeting 
between Israeli and Jordanian leaders.203   
Returning to the Forward, in an opinion piece the Rwandan Genocide is used as an 
example of how the American left should learn to use force when necessary.  The following 
passage is the only part of this article in which Rwanda is addressed and shows the general tenor 
of the article. 
America doesn’t have to be part of every multinational force, but we should at least join in 
somewhere, most logically in Haiti and Bosnia.  Rwanda has virtually slipped by on a radar 
operating on genocidal overload, but one can hope that the American left would support the 
formation of a multinational African force to end the slaughter there.204 
  
It is telling that someone working for the Forward would mention Rwanda slipping “under the 
radar” when that publication was contributing to that very problem.    
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The final time Rwanda comes up in The Forward is in a story that castigates American 
inaction and the futility of the UN.  While the laudable goal of trying to get America to act is a 
part of this opinion piece, and the condemnation of Boutros-Ghali and the UN is obviously valid 
to anyone knowledgeable of the history of the atrocities that took place in either Bosnia or 
Rwanda, the main goal seems to be a combination of making sure that mass slaughter does not 
become another average tragedy story and that the US and the UN will be prepared for future 
ethnic strife and act accordingly.205  This is one of the strongest opinion pieces looked at for this 
chapter of this work but it seems largely fatalistic, as if there is nothing that can be done by this 
point in Rwanda.  Even though the slaughter was declining as the RPF was pushing further into 
government held territory, were there not war criminals still in need of capture?  The situation 
that was perceived by some as the other possible Genocide of the time, Bosnia, actually garnered 
much more mention during the entire period of the Rwandan Genocide than Rwanda did.  It was 
mentioned in passing in four of the five stories discussed above as well as in fifteen other stories, 
eight of them directly dealing with Bosnia and seven others where the situation is addressed in 
relation to some other topic.  The coverage of the Forward is noteworthy and rather surprising.  
A newspaper in a democratic nation, which serves an audience made up primarily of, and 
directed towards, a group that was the main target of the quintessential Genocide, might be 
expected to have more compassion for, or at the very least interest in the plight of others 
suffering from attempts to eradicate them.   
 During the course of coverage of the Rwandan Genocide reporters and columnists often 
fell back on clichés that are informed by the same thought processes talked about by authors such 
as Keim and Said.  The mysticizing and othering of Rwandans in many ways took the 
                                                 
205 The Forward, “Rhetoric Fatigue” page 7, June 10, 1994.   
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simultaneous Genocide and Civil War and painted them as something that was uniquely African, 
and specifically Rwandan, phenomenon.  While the precipitating events that led to the Genocide 
are certainly a part of the history of Rwanda they are not uniquely Rwandan.  These events bear 
striking similarities to other Genocides and crimes against humanity that have happened 
throughout the twentieth century, if not throughout human history.  Authors and humanitarian 
organizations have warned of the need for early detection to prevent Genocide from 1944 
through the present day.  While each death in Rwanda was unique and the circumstances that 
made the slaughter possible were also unique, that it happened was not.  Genocides have 
occurred throughout the world.  This was not an African problem.  This was a problem involving 
economics, greed, lust for power, racism, and envy.  In this it is no more an African problem 
than the Holocaust was a European problem.  The Holocaust was a European tragedy, while the 
Rwandan Genocide was an African tragedy.   
 By looking at the Rwandan Genocide from a lens of Western cultural imperialism many 
Western journalists created a narrative that was at best half truth.  Were the “ancient hatreds” 
displayed by Hutu for Tutsi and Tutsi for Hutu vastly different from any “ancient hatreds” that 
Germans may have had for Jews or even Jews for Germans?  Considering the already addressed 
narrative of when Tutsi entered Rwanda it would appear that even the timelines of when Jews 
came to Germany and Tutsi to Rwanda were similar.  Were Germans barbaric because they were 
Germanic?  Or Central European?  Or were they a people that, as a group, committed a horrible 
crime, as a group, and have since made efforts to atone for that crime?  The latter seems more 
likely.  And while the heat of the moment of reporting, especially when one considers the 
massive and incredibly fast death toll, may explain some of the reporting that many journalistic 
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works written after the Genocide, with the potential for a cooling off period show similar 
language and thought processes is telling.   
 By looking at the Genocide from a lens of savagery, in an African milieu, from a Western 
perspective, journalists were painting a picture that included “othering” language the made 
exotic and primitive something that has happened often in human history.  While it could be 
argued that the need to eliminate the other is a fundamentally primitive mental function, 
something that dates back to the beginnings of human society, the shear level organization 
required to plan and perpetrate a Genocide, let alone one with such a staggeringly rapid death 
toll, involves many higher mental functions.  Planning the execution of 800,000 people is a 
barbaric act, not the act of barbarian.   
 This type of coverage creates a distance between the Genocide in Rwanda and the 
civilized world.  Rwanda seemed to be too hopeless for help to be effective if this type of hatred 
was normal there.  And this allowed the linguistic and diplomatic tactics discussed in the next 
chapter to be effective for as long as they were. 
 There is an additional facet to the media coverage described above.  The large focus on 
the Refugee Crisis helped turn Western attention away from Genocide and towards a more 
humanitarian relief story.  While there is no reason not to cover this story more attention to the 
control that from Rwandan government, military, and Interahamwe leaders had in the camp, and 
more reminders of the atrocities that occurred on the ground might have equalized things more.  
On many levels victims of the Refugee Crisis were covered with as much, if not more, 
compassion than victims of the Genocide.  This was a situation more easily covered, that more 
easily played into Western notions of the helpless African villager.  This coverage showed the 
same “othering” of Rwandans that coverage of the Genocide did.  But this narrative allowed for 
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more calls to action, and appears to have precipitated more action.  The West largely ignored the 
Genocide.  Even France’s Operation Turquoise has been shown by many authors to be largely 
self interested.206  Returning to the more boots on the ground theory, the large amounts of 
coverage of the Refugee Crisis may or may not have forced action but that the coverage of this 
portion of the story of Rwanda in 1994 gained more international support than the Genocide did.  
Whether it was more understandable, an easier crisis to respond to, or if the international 
community was shamed into action as more facts came out of Rwanda regarding the Genocide, 
more action did occur.  
 The increased international activity with the Refugee Crisis is not the main thrust of the 
coverage.  The “othering” of Rwandans is, be they victims, perpetrators, or witnesses to the 
Genocide, or refugees in Zaire.  The coverage of the various crises in a way that painted them as 
the rustle of African primitivism set many things in motion.  No Genocide this effective can be 
spontaneous violence, nor can it be the workings of a primitive society.   
 By looking at print coverage of the Rwandan Genocide in American periodicals not just 
as a matter of “othering” language but also from the lens of the Einsensee and Stromberg article 
there are multiple things that come up.207  When looking at a death toll that was less than one 
quarter over the course of seven years that the 100 day Rwandan Genocide was the numbers for 
various magazines certainly lean towards the natural disaster numbers of Einsensee and 
Stromberg, but are not quite as stark.  It did not take 40 times the amount of deaths for Rwanda 
to be covered in similar fashion to the former Yugoslavia.  Looking at the three major magazines 
during the period from April to August shows that Rwanda received 53 stories to Yugoslavia’s 
                                                 
206 See Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis; Kroslak, The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide, and various others.   
207 Einsensee and Stromberg, “News Floods, News Droughts, American Disaster Relief,” 3.   
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43.208  While shows some inflation towards Rwanda people were dying at rate of 8,000 per day, 
while in Yugoslavia the death toll was precipitously lower.  Once the more esoteric publications 
come into the picture the numbers tend to skew even more towards Yugoslavia.  Africa’s 
importance is lesser than that of Europe, even when Africans are dying at much higher rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
208 Time, Newsweek, and US News and World Report, April- August, 1994.   
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CONCLUSION: TOO LITTLE UNDERSTANDING AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 
During the Rwandan Genocide there were other international issues at the time such as 
the collapsing former Yugoslavia with its multipart ethno-religious conflict involving warfare, 
slaughter of civilians, international brinksmanship, and such abhorrent practices as rape rooms 
and mass executions as part of a Genocide, disguised as “ethnic cleansing.”  Add to that the Haiti 
crisis and a realigning world after the Cold War with a single superpower and the international 
issues are staggering.209  When domestic news stories such as the OJ Simpson case and Kurt 
Cobain’s suicide are taken into account the amount of things vying for American media and 
governmental attention are immense.210   The international community was legally bound to 
intervene and many nations did everything in their power to not live up to that obligation.  In 
many international humanitarian crises America leads the way and sets the tone for global 
response.  They were not the only, or even the main, power working against intervention in 
Rwanda.  France had its own reasons for its limited intervention and China, Russia, and the 
United Kingdom had little interest in deploying troops to Rwanda.  The path of print media 
coverage that was taken allowed the great powers to do so.  A media more concerned about 
sensationalizing a Genocide, characterizing Rwandans on all sides of the Genocide and Civil 
                                                 
209 For Bosnia Mann, ibid, 356, and Eller, ibid., 243-95, For Haiti see Jonathon Shattuck, Freedom On Fire: Human 
Rights Wars and America’s Response, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 6, 15, 77-112.   
210 For Simpson see Time, 1 August, 1994.  The issues of celebrity, wealth, the race of the accused, and the charges 
of Mark Furman being a racist in many ways divided many Americans.  This trial highlighted the myriad issues of 
race and class that were, and still are, extant within the US.  These issues mitigate the inaction of the Clinton 
Administration and provide context for the large amounts of attention paid to this case by the US media machine 
with the addition of this story’s ability to sell magazines and newspapers as well as advertising economic and social 
factions beyond the othering of Africa were at play.  With the Cobain suicide and the attention that people, 
especially America’s youth of the time, likely had an effect on the attention that people under the age of 30 paid to 
the Rwandan Genocide, though trying to quantify that is not something this thesis should, or is even capable of, 
doing.   
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War as “the other” (individually and collectively), and propping up the myth of a backwards, 
primordial, chthonic, and unknowable Africa did not help matters.  In many ways they made 
matters worse.   
 The other topics discussed were likely purposefully covered more than a Genocide due to 
the potential for advertising revenue and increased circulation.  Once one also factors in the 
“Orientalizing” or “othering” or “Mistaking of” Rwanda by the media the notion of an 
intervention became improbable at best.  Why would America waste its troops in a land where 
“ancient tribal hatred” and “primordial violence” were the buzzwords of the day?  The efforts to 
not say the “G” word were largely not needed by the Clinton Administration.211  America would 
be rather unlikely to get behind a mission to save people that were being portrayed as obviously 
intent on killing each other.  The dual Genocide narrative was a powerful force in “othering” 
Rwandans.  In the minds of Americans Rwandans, victims of Genocide and perpetrators, were 
“tribal” peoples, engaged in revenge for “ancient” hatreds, involved in a bloodletting on a 
massive, frightening, and unfortunate scale was appalling.  But the media was telling the public 
that this is what happens in Africa.  They were telling people that this hatred went back to a time 
before European knowledge of the existence of Rwanda.  This was something that preceded the 
recorded history of Rwanda.  These hatreds and their causes were somehow ingrained, a part of 
not only the culture, heritage, and history of Rwanda but also part of the very DNA of Tutsi and 
Hutu.  There is a type of fatalism in the coverage.  This type of hatred was portrayed as, in its 
own way, immortal.  America already suffered from notions of peacekeeping fatigue due to 
Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, et al, why did it need another hopeless windmill to tilt at?  The 
sources state that it did not, no matter what its duty was as not only a member, but the leading 
                                                 
211 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 274-5 
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member, of the international community.  In a monopolar, post Cold War world America was the 
global super power.  It had a legal imperative to act, instead it obfuscated, deflected, and dodged 
that responsibility until a tiny rebel army did what the world could not do, and rarely if ever has 
done, stopped a Genocide.  The RPF did this even with French troops in charge of a large swath 
of Rwanda in which the genocidaires were still active and hiding, if not openly operating.  Even 
with fairly open hostility coming from French troops and the former government and 
Interahamwe forces still armed, they stopped a Genocide.212  Whatever crimes the RPF 
committed before or since, and more than a few scholars and activists would argue that there 
have been many,213 that outnumbered rebel forces stopped the killings.    
The similarity of language used in media coverage of Bosnia and Rwanda is on some 
levels unsettling, but for all of the horror unfolding in the former Yugoslavia it was unfolding at 
a snail’s pace compared to Rwanda.  The media was given time to get it right.  Or perhaps more 
honestly the long drawn out carnage of the breakup of Yugoslavia forced the media to develop 
sources on the ground, talk to academics and diplomats with knowledge of the area, and adjust 
their coverage.  Yugoslavia’s collapse might still have been being described in the same 
language of chthonic hatred that the civilized, enlightened, and post modern American society of 
the 1990s could not understand but they had several advantages.  Aside from the slow build 
towards collapse and a slower path through bloodshed there were also factors such as the people 
of the former Yugoslavia being not only European but Caucasian European; they were in a part 
of Europe that had a hand in igniting both World Wars; and in a part of Europe now bereft of the 
level of clientship by the former leaders of the Communist Bloc, Russia, as the most prominent 
                                                 
212 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 296 299. 
213 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis; Prunier, Africa’s World War; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, among 
others.   
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state of the former USSR, and China.  This last point afforded America a chance to have more 
influence in a part of Europe it has been unable to prior.   
The efforts the world took on behalf of Bosnia, and did not take on behalf of Rwanda, 
very much line up with what Einsensee and Stromberg have put forth in their study on natural 
disasters.214 It is not just in natural occurrences that Africa is largely ignored, it is in almost all 
forms of disaster relief.  Even the disaster relief that is taken does more to exacerbate regional 
problems and border disputes as it does to quell them.  By supporting long term refugee camps 
similar situations to the start of the Rwandan Civil War and the Congo Wars215 are almost 
guaranteed to happen.  The situation in Rwanda both started and ended with refugee populations 
displaced from Rwanda.  In both situations those displaced represented the elites of the deposed 
regime, even if the majority of them never experienced that level of power or privilege.   
All motivation for things involving intervention might not be this sinister and calculating, 
but these motivations do exist.  Europe has long been an area of concern for the United States.  
Four of the five official declared wars that the United States has been involved in were against 
European opponents, five of six if the Revolutionary War is added to this list.  Two of those wars 
were the World Wars.  Additionally the officially undeclared, but very real, Cold War turned all 
of Europe, indeed all of the world, into a theatre of constant political, diplomatic, economic, 
propaganda, and espionage brinksmanship.  Shifting this focus so soon after the end of the Cold 
War would prove to be difficult at best.216 
                                                 
214 Einsensee and Stromberg, “News Floods, News Droughts, American Disaster Relief.”  
215 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis and Prunier, Africa’s World War.   
216 http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm last 
accessed 3/10/2013.  The American Revolution against Britain, the War of 1812 against Britain, the Spanish-
American War against Spain, the First World War against Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, and the Second 
World War against Germany, Italy, and Japan were the wars against, in whole or in part, European nations.  The 
Cold War, though unofficial would also fall into this category as the USSR and many of their allies were European.  
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Once the dust settled a series of multiyear wars broke out in the former Zaire which 
claimed the lives of millions.  America, NATO, and the UN did little to nothing under successive 
but there another intervention again in the former Yugoslavia, this time to aid Kosovo.   
 Beyond that issue the basic fact is that America does not understand Africa.  It spent the 
entirety of the Cold War using that continent as a chess board upon which it could fight proxy 
wars.  It allowed erstwhile ally France to not only keep a sphere of influence in Africa but to 
expand it.  America, France, Britain, the USSR, and other powers used Africa as a playground 
politically, militarily, and economically for decades.  The media, whether news or advertising, in 
America turned Africa into a distant and unknowable land, where wild animals live next to 
people, where differences between disparate African groups are prehistoric and unintelligible to 
the modern mind, and where bloodshed and humanitarian crises are the norm.217  Rwanda 
provided no cause for singing “We are the World” and cutting a check.  People were dying 
painful deaths not caused by famine but caused by torture, machete, firearm, and hand grenade.  
How could America stop that?  And why would they?  The implicit mentality appeared to be “It 
is Africa after all, this will just happen again.”  
 What is lost in all of this is that the UN has rarely, if ever, stopped a Genocide.  More 
Genocides have occurred after the UN convention on Genocide came into effect than occurred in 
the hundred years before it was enacted.218  More people have died of Genocide,219 even though 
these numbers have to be stacked against the tens of millions that died at the hands of Hitler and 
                                                                                                                                                             
The outlier from officially declared wars was the Mexican American War.  To say  there is an Eurocentric bias in 
the US is to state the obvious.   
217 Keim, Mistaking Africa, 35-40, 105-7, & 212-3. 
218 http://genocidewatch.org/genocide/genocidespoliticides.html and http://genocidewatch.org/genocide.html both 
last accessed on 8/15/2013, it should be noted that Genocide Watch also states that more people have died from 
Genocide, Politicide, and other forms of mass violence have killed more people than those killed in combat in all of 
the wars of the twentieth century.   
219 Ibid.   
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Stalin alone.  Yet nothing happens.  Genocides do not happen in First World nations very often.  
They more often occur in areas that are out of sight and out of mind by the international 
community.  That major world powers commit Genocide is nothing new.  The first Genocide of 
the twentieth century was committed by Germany in 1904 in what is now Namibia.  They also 
committed the most recognizable and written about Genocide, the Holocaust.  Japan perpetrated 
the Rape of Nanking and other crimes against humanity such as the use of Comfort Women 
during World War II.  Stalinist Russia had the purges and the liquidation of the Kulaks in the 
1930s and beyond.  China’s Great Leap Forward is probably the largest Politicide that ever 
occurred.  Turkey’s attacks on Armenians is often cited as the first modern Genocide but it is still 
historically debated and Genocidal assaults on other Christian ethnic groups during that time are 
largely unknown even among historians.  Genocide is not new.  But Genocide is also not 
stopped.   
 Even if there was a Genocide occurring, why did they continuously get involved in the 
same region of Europe, what was once one country, while ignoring Rwanda, Burundi, and the 
Congo?  Were they expecting to teach the Europeans a lesson, and assuming they could not teach 
that lesson to Africans?  The constant attention on Europe may never end, but the lack of 
attention on Africa likely will not either.  As long as there is a perception of Africa, and its 
component nations, as a place of savages where only bad things happen Africa stands little 
chance of Africans being equated as equal on the world stage.  If only Europeans are worthy of 
anti-Genocide intervention, do Europeans and Americans even consider Africans, be they in 
Rwanda, Congo, Darfur, or Egypt, to be human?  While the answer politicians give would likely 
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be different actions speak clearly, and they loudly reply no.  Just ask the Coptic Christians after a 
short time under the Arab Spring.220 
  
                                                 
220 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/24/opinion/the-copts-and-the-arab-spring.html?_r=0 , 
http://www.genocidewatch.org/egypt.html, and http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/in-egypt-the-warning-signs-of-
genocide/.  Last accessed 3/15/2013.  While the conditions do not yet rise to the level of Genocide the intent, the 
propaganda, the weapons and the will to commit Genocide all seem present.  And here we go again.  For a reaction 
by the Coptic community in America see http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-10-19/local/35277298_1_coptic-
christians-hussein-tantawi-egyptian-army last accessed 3/15/2013.   
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APPENDIX A: 
TIMELINE OF THE RWANDA GENOCIDE  
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1506 Large scale unification and state formation in the Kingdom of Rwanda 
1885 Conference of Berlin decides that Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi) will become German colonies 
1894 Gustav Adolf von Gotzen, of Germany, becomes the first recorded European to set foot in Rwanda  
1900 The White Fathers missionaries found their first mission in Rwanda 
1907 A permanent German colonial post to Rwanda is established in Kigali 
1910 The borders of Uganda (Britain), Belgian Congo, and German East Africa (including Rwanda and Burundi) 
are codified 
1913 The cash crop coffee comes to Rwanda 
1916 Belgian military forces seize Ruanda-Urundi as part of military operations involving the Great War 
1923 Ruanda-Urundi is put under the control of Belgium under League of Nations mandate 
1933 Belgian colonial masters perform a census and officially divide Rwandans and Burundians into permanent 
legal ethnic categories of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa 
July 1959 Tutsi king dies under suspicious circumstances 
November 1959 Large parts of the Rwandan Hutu population rebel, causing flight of many Tutsi into Burundi.  
Belgium now favors the majority Hutu ethnic group 
1961 The Tutsi monarchy is abolished and a republic is declared.  More anti-Tutsi ethnic violence leads to more 
Tutsi migration from Rwanda into neighboring countries 
1973 Tutsi removed from many governmental and academic posts.  More anti-Tutsi violence leads to more Tutsi 
refugees.  Juvenal Habyarimana’s successful rebellion leads to a one party system that remains in place until the 
Genocide starts and Habyarimana is assassinated in 1994. 
1982 Violence against Tutsi refugees in Uganda leaves them trapped between hostile forces. 
1986 Habyarimana government announces that it will not allow Tutsi refugees to return due to overpopulation 
issues. 
1986   Victory in Uganda for the rebel Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army, a part of the military 
faction of the NRA were Tutsi exiles from Rwanda and their descendents  
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1988 Rwandan Patriotic Force formed in Uganda.  Political tension leads the government of Uganda to remove overt 
support from the Tutsi military faction while tacitly supporting the formation and early operations of the RPF 
October 1990 RPF invades Rwanda 
October 1990 First arms deals between Rwanda and Egypt and South Africa 
October 1990 300+ Tutsi slaughtered in Rwanda 
January 1991 More massacres of Tutsi in four different prefectures 
February 1991 RPF attacks in response to anti-Tutsi violence 
June 1991 Multi party constitution drafted in Rwanda 
June 1991 French intelligence report states that a cabal of racist extremists centered around first lady Agathe 
Habyarimana is interested in blocking democratic changes and shared power with Tutsi 
February 1992 Tutsis killed in Bugesera, which attributed in part to Radio Rwanda by human rights organizations 
October 1992 Phillip Reytjens, a noted academic specializing in the Rwanda-Burundi area, holds a press conference 
announcing that there are dangerous militias mobilizing in Rwanda against the Tutsi 
November 1992 Hutu extremist Dr. Mugesera announces that Hutu should send Tutsi back to Ethiopia via north 
flowing rivers.  This foreshadows one of the iconic scenes of the Rwandan Genocide 
December 1992 US military forces land on the beaches of Somalia as part of a humanitarian mission 
January 1993 Negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania lead to the blue print for a multiparty, broad based government 
January 1993 300 Tutsi killed in northwest Rwanda 
February 1993 RPF offensive puts RPF troops very close to the Rwandan capital of Kigali.  The Rwandan 
government turns to France for military aid to stop the RPF.   
February 1993 This offensive contributes to 1 million displaced people within Rwanda 
March 1993 UN report states that more than 2000 Rwandan Tutsi have been killed since 1990 in Rwanda 
April 1993 the International Red Cross releases a statement predicting a humanitarian catastrophe in Rwanda, 
famine seems likely at this point. 
May 1993 Rwanda buys arms from France 
May 1993 UN recommendation for a peace keeping mission to Rwanda  
June 1993 United Nations Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMOR) codified within the UN 
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August 1993 Arusha Accords signed, they are designed to bring power sharing and multiparty elections within 22 
months 
October 1993 The US loses eighteen peacekeeping troops in Somalia 
October 1993 UN creates United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to implement the Arusha 
Accords.  UNOMOR is to become part of UNAMIR 
November 1993 Organization of African Unity Neutral Military Observer Group becomes a part of UNAMIR 
November 1993 Belgian troops arrive for UNAMIR duty 
November 1993 More Tutsi killed in northern Rwanda 
January 1994 Rwanda takes its rotating seat on the UN Security Council 
January 1994 The Transitional government laid out in the Arusha Accords does not come together, with blame being 
aimed at all involved parties by those involved parties 
January 1994 Interahamwe stage a violent demonstration in Kigali 
January 1994 CIA report states that if conflict returns to Rwanda upwards of half a million people are likely to die 
January 1994 UNAMIR Commanding Officer Romeo Dallaire tells the UN that he has an informant tied to Hutu 
extremists willing to show him large stockpiles of weapons stating that a Genocide is planned.  Dallaire fails in his 
attempts to gain permission to seize the weapons caches  
February 1994 Dallaire informs the UN of hit lists, death squads, and the disbursement of weapons among militia 
groups.  He also asks for reinforcements. 
February 1994 The US government puts out travel advisories for Rwanda 
February 1994 The International Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders missions both prepare for large scale 
casualties 
March 1994-2 April 1994 The mandate for UNAMIR Is running out and the Secretary General requests an 
extension.  His envoy to Rwanda tells the various sides that without implementation of the Arusha Accords the UN 
will pull out.   
5 April 1994 The UN Security Council approves an extension of UNAMIR which states that without 
implementation of the Accords within six weeks UNAMIR will disband 
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6 April 1994 Assassination of President Habyarimana when his plane is shot down.  Some killings start 
immediately.   
7 April 1994 the Genocide begins in earnest, the moderate Hutu Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana is assassinated and 
a contingent of the Belgian forces within UNAMIR are captured, tortured, and killed.   
7 April 1994 RPF clashes with Rwandan Army and Presidential Guard forces in Kigali 
7 April 1994 Interahamwe, government regular forces, the Presidential Guard, and the gendarmerie start the mass 
killings of Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu 
9 April 1994 The RPF mobilizes in their territories and open warfare resumes in various parts of Rwanda 
10 April 1994 The US embassy in Kigali is closed 
11 April 1994 A temporary ceasefire is put together to allow foreign nationals to be evacuated 
11 April 1994 Belgian peacekeepers leave Kicukiro abandoning 2,000 people to the Interahamwe  
12 April 1994 French embassy closes 
12 April 1994 The Rwandan interim government moves from Kigali to Gitarama due to RPF advances 
14 April 1994 Belgium announces that their troops will be leaving Rwanda and UNAMIR 
20 April 1994 Final Belgian peacekeepers leave Rwanda 
22 April 1994 UN Security Council votes to draw down of UNAMIR 
24 April 1994 Doctors Without Borders closes its operation in Butare  
28 April 1994 Oxfam NGO stats that the killings in Rwanda are a Genocide 
28-29 April 1994 Approximately 250,000 refugees flee from Rwanda into Tanzania in what  was at the time the 
largest human migration seen by the UN 
29 April 1994 A UN Security council meeting becomes a long debate about the use of the word Genocide in relation 
to Rwanda.  The US and UK, both permanent seat holders on the council with veto powers, are against the use of the 
word 
1 May 1994 The refugee situation puts Rwanda in the world media spotlight 
4 May 1994 Boutros-Ghali states on Nightline that the situation in Rwanda is Genocide 
5 May 1994 President Museveni of Uganda accuses the Rwandan government of Genocide 
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13 May 1994 Boutros-Ghali pushes the Security Council on an earlier recommendation of Dallaire to bring 5,500 
more troops to Rwanda.   
13 May 1994 Dallaire has conversations with US Senators Paul Simon and James Jefford.  The Senators agree to 
contact the Clinton Administration 
17 May 1994 The suggestion of 5,500 more troops is accepted and codified but no troops are deployed 
25 May 1994 Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal each offer up 800 troops, Nigeria and Zimbabwe soon sign on with 
similar promises.   
2 June 1994 Kabgayi falls to the RPF 
5 June 1994 A Canadian relief flight is stopped from landing in Kigali due to intense fighting in the city.  Further 
flights are stopped for the time being 
8 June 1994 UNAMIR mandate extended to December 1994 
10 June 1994 White House press conference in which the “acts of Genocide” argument took place 
13 June 1994  Gitarama falls to the RPF 
17 June 1994 France offers to deploy a mission to Rwanda under French command to bridge the gap between the 
current situation and the deployment of further UN forces 
21 June 1994 French troops are deployed just beyond Rwandan borders in Zaire  
22 June 1994 The Security Council accepts France’s offer, Operation Turquoise now has UN approval 
24 June 1994 French forces cross into Rwanda from Zaire 
28 June 1994 UN Commission on Human Rights report is issued stating that he killings in Rwanda amounted to a 
planned and methodical Genocide 
1 July 1994 A group is set up by the Security Council to investigate acts of Genocide within Rwanda.221 
2 July 1994 Boutros-Ghali backs a plan to allow France to set up a humanitarian safe zone in the area of southwest 
Rwanda that they control 
3 July 1994 The RPF gain control of Butare 
4 July 1994 The RPF gain control of the capital, Kigali 
                                                 
221 It should be noted that is approximately 78 or 79 days after the start of the Genocide.   
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4 July 1994 The RPF announces plans to implement a government based on the Arusha Accords.  This plan does not 
include a place for those that were genocidaires 
5 July 1994 Operations Turquoise establishes a humanitarian safe zone in southwest Rwanda 
6 July 1994 Resumption of Canadian relief flights  
7 July 1994 Kigali airport is reopened 
13 July 1994 The RPF takes Ruhengeri 
13-14 July 1994 Approximately 1 million people begin flooding into Zaire from Rwanda, largely from the 
humanitarian safe zone  
14 July 1994 6,000 people per hour flee into the French controlled safe zone  
15 July 1994 The US announces that it no longer recognizes the interim government of Rwanda 
17 July 1994 the RPF takes Gisenyi, this largely brings about the end of the Rwandan Civil War and the Genocide 
22 July 1994 The US government announces that it will begin humanitarian relief to  Zaire to help the refugees 
October 1994 A UN Commission of Experts releases a report that states that Genocide did occur in Rwanda 
November 1994 The UN approves a measure to fund, organize, and operate a court to prosecute war crimes during 
the Rwandan Genocide222 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
222 Melvern: A People Betrayed, 239-248.   
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